[tt] [x-risk] Building research accountability for biosecurity

Tue Aug 19 12:44:31 UTC 2008

----- Forwarded message from "Hughes, James J." <James.Hughes at trincoll.edu> -----

From: "Hughes, James J." <James.Hughes at trincoll.edu>
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2008 15:08:57 -0400
To: existential at transhumanism.org
Subject: [x-risk] Building research accountability for biosecurity
Reply-To: For discussion of existential risks <existential at transhumanism.org>

http://www.scienceprogress.org/2008/06/dual-use-biosecurity/

The "What if?" of Dual-Use Research Awareness
How Should Scientists Deal with Their Concerns?

A clear set of policy guidelines for reporting biosecurity concerns in
research labs is clearly in order. Here are some suggestions.

By Michael Stebbins, Ph.D. | Wednesday, June 11th, 2008 

The principle is simple. The products, information and techniques of
some life sciences research could be misused for nefarious purposes,
such as bioterrorism, and the scientific community should do everything
it can to prevent such misuse without impeding research progress. What
is unclear is what steps scientists should take when they have concerns
about such "dual-use" research.

The problem is that we (myself included) have not taken the long-view on
this issue.

Dual-use research has been the subject of much discussion in the
biosecurity community since the 2003 release of the National Research
Council report, Biotechnology Research in the Age of Terrorism, which
suggested that, "Adequately addressing the potential risks that research
in advanced biotechnology could be misused by hostile parties will
require educating the community of life scientists, both about the
nature of these risks and about the responsibilities of scientists to
address and manage them." But convincing scientists that they should add
dual-use research awareness and evaluations to their already long list
of idiosyncratic worries turned out to be far harder than anyone
imagined.

Enter the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. In June of
last year, the NSABB released their Proposed Framework for the Oversight
of Dual Use Life Sciences Research, in which the board recommend that
life scientists receive "mandatory education about dual-use research
issues and policies," with the goal of "ensure(ing) that all individuals
engaged in life sciences research are aware of the concerns and issues
regarding dual use research and their roles and responsibilities in the
oversight of such research."

In addition to mandatory training, both the National Research Council
and the NSABB have advocated for the creation of codes of conduct for
life sciences researchers that includes dual-use awareness. Now,
research societies are preparing and implementing their codes of
conduct, infusing another layer of awareness into the research
community.

Indeed, it will not be long before it is mandatory that all federal
grantees in the life sciences receive such training, and that all
biologists sign codes of conduct. Awareness will spread like happy
little dandelions. That is until someone points out that they are weeds.

Don't get me wrong. I am an advocate of mandatory training and think
codes of conduct are a good tool for increasing awareness. Not least of
the reasons for my support being that the Federation of American
Scientists arguably has the most extensive dual-use training materials
available to date in the form of our multimedia Case Studies in Dual-Use
Research. Wide distribution of these case studies and materials created
by other groups has been a goal of ours from the time we started the
project.

The problem is that we (myself included) have not taken the long-view on
this issue. If we dramatically increase awareness, then we also increase
the chances that scientists will have concerns about dual-use research
or worse-suspicions that a colleague is up to no good. What the NSABB,
National Research Council and the biosecurity community on the whole
have failed to fully address is how those researchers should attend to
their concerns. Government-issued guidelines for researchers will only
get them so far.

Since part of the duty of a responsible researcher will certainly be
reporting unsafe experiments or suspicious behavior, instituting codes
of conduct and training all scientists makes potential whistleblowers
out of every working biologist. This creates an immediate need for
protocols and methods for scientists to get advice and report their
concerns.

There is currently no reliable independent system in place for these
researchers to report or receive advice on how to handle their concerns.

It is well recognized that a major barrier to reporting such incidents
to law enforcement, supervisors, biosafety officers, or institutional
review boards, is the fear of reprisal. This might also be compounded by
some members of the scientific community not trusting government
officials and law enforcement in particular. This extends from
laboratory technicians and support staff to primary investigators. Even
if there is no indication of foul play, scientists may feel that there
are experiments being conducted at their institution that have serious
dual-use implications, or that are dangerous to those conducting them
and their colleagues.

There is currently no reliable independent system in place for these
researchers to report or receive advice on how to handle their concerns.
Such a system would be a valuable contribution to strengthening
biosecurity awareness and participation within the biological research
community. It should be pointed out that such a system is a good way to
get across the idea that official whistle-blowing is not the first and
only resort.

I and others have suggested that we need to build a secure
Internet-based system where scientists will be able to report their
concerns and receive advice and recommendations on the steps that they
should or should not take. Concerns will naturally run the range of how
to fill out dual-use reporting forms on grants to reporting potentially
illegal situations in the lab. It is important that the government not
operate the system to ensure buy in. Rather, an ombudsman network should
be run by a non-government organization that will allow partial
anonymity.

In the event that a clear cause of action is required, such as when a
law is being broken, a non-government organization would be well-placed
to help facilitate conversations with law enforcement, make queries on
the behalf of the scientist to government, or alleviate concerns without
endangering their status at the institute.

The system will have to be backed by a large group of advisors,
including experts from multiple science disciplines, ethicists, legal
and law enforcement representatives to ensure that users are receiving
timely and accurate advice. The system administrator will have to be
available at all times and have constant access to advisors in the case
of a serious problem.

One major concern of scientists will be the preservation of anonymity.
This issue can be simply handled by having staff farm out the query to
advisors without revealing the identity of the scientist. Total
anonymity, however, cannot be completely preserved in such a system.

In principle, users will turn to this system when they feel
uncomfortable reporting concerns within their institution or when they
are unsure of who to turn to. Responses will either ask for further
information, clarification, or report back advice on the appropriate
course of action.

Users must also feel comfortable that the information they divulge will
not be released to anyone unless they approve it. This can be
accomplished by making users agree to simple terms before sending their
query. Those terms will detail operation standards and will inform users
under which conditions the managers have a legal responsibility to
inform appropriate authorities, and that they may be contacted by such
authorities directly in the event that a law has been or is about to be
broken.

Detailed records of responses and customizable electronic form letters
will allow us to provide useful assistance and inform users of their
rights and the laws that might apply to them in a timely manner. It
should be stressed that in the event a user reports an imminent threat,
they will automatically receive instructions on who they should contact.
There are several important issues that will have to be addressed while
developing a biosecurity reporting system, among them:

Whistleblower Laws. The United States has a well-established set of
"whistleblower" laws that protect people from reprisals for reporting.
There are several excellent non-profit groups that specialize in this
area and it will be important to bring them in for legal advice and
possibly to present a series of Frequently Asked Questions on the site
for scientists to learn about their options.

Legal Advice. We will need legal advice on a broad range of issues,
including the liability associated with giving advice, maintaining
anonymity, the situations under which those with knowledge of possible
crimes are legally obligated to contact law enforcement, and applicable
laws for users.

Advisory Boards. An advisory board consisting of scientists, ethicists,
biosecurity experts, and legal advisors will have to be brought in for
the design and implementation. A second advisory board will have to be
available for advice on individual cases. It will be important to have a
wide array of expertise and knowledge on hand to address any reports
that come in.

Law Enforcement Guidelines. A clear relationship with law enforcement
will need to be established so that in the event that there is a user
who is uncomfortable going to law enforcement themselves, we would be
able to report an incident on their behalf.

Testing. It will be necessary to test the system through a series of
table-top scenarios that provide challenges to our response times and
content.

It is a virtual certainty that this type of system would eventually be
abused maliciously against other scientists trying to slow down a
competitor, or exact revenge. In that sense, the system itself would
have dual-use potential and like science, safeguards and awareness will
reduce, but might not eliminate, unfortunate incidences.

It is also hard to predict how often such a system would be used and
what percentage of the time it would receive cranks. But it is equally
unclear to what degree dual-use research is a threat to national
security. If we are going to require scientists to learn about the
potential for misuse, then it is essential that they have a place to
turn if they recognize potential misuse or have questions about
complying with legal and ethical requirements.

Michael Stebbins is the Director of Biology Policy for the Federation of
American Scientists, President of the SEA Action Fund and author of Sex,
Drugs and DNA: Science's Taboos Confronted.

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