[tt] The Space Review: "We must ride the lightning": Robert Heinlein and American spaceflight

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"We must ride the lightning": Robert Heinlein and American spaceflight
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/901/1
[Linked by Arts & Letters Daily.]
7.7.2

Robert Heinlein envisioned a future in 1945 where the atomic bomb
made conventional warfare obsolete and thus required the development
of rockets, which could also be used for space exploration. (credit:
The Heinlein Prize Trust)

by Dwayne A. Day

July 7 is the 100th anniversary of the birth of Robert Anson
Heinlein. In Kansas City the Heinlein Centennial will celebrate his
writings and feature talks by the NASA administrator Michael Griffin
as well as Heinlein scholars and enthusiasts. Heinlein is the
closest thing that the American pro-space movement has to a patron
saint.

Science fiction has, for good or ill, had a major effect upon how
Americans think about spaceflight. Many early rocket engineers were
inspired by Jules Verne, many current space enthusiasts were
inspired by Star Trek. Heinlein certainly inspired many in the
entrepreneurial space movement.

Heinlein's unique strength was his willingness to reexamine
assumptions. He had what Henry Kuttner called in his introduction to
Heinlein's 1953 book Revolt in 2100 "the innocent eye." An article
in the current edition of Reason magazine addresses Heinlein's role
in the history of libertarian ideology and notes that although
Heinlein's works ranged across many different topics and seemed to
explore different philosophies, they generally shared certain main
themes, one of the main ones being opposition to centralized
authority.

Despite this view, Heinlein also had a pragmatic core. He believed
in a strong military and opposition to Soviet communism. In his
nonfiction writings and his political activism he frequently
advocated both.

With these concepts in mind, it is worth looking at a rather amazing
memo that Heinlein wrote in 1945 advocating a rigorous American
missile and space program. Heinlein wrote it soon after the United
States dropped the atomic bomb on Japan. He argued that the bomb had
changed the world and he believed that intercontinental rockets
would also have a major effect on warfare. He wanted the United
States to get out in front of this new development like it had with
the bomb.

  Heinlein is the closest thing that the American pro-space movement
  has to a patron saint.

There are many interesting aspects to the memo, but what is unique
about it is that it occupies a point precisely in the middle of the
overlap between science fiction and current reality. Although
Heinlein thought that he was discussing the world as it was--or was
about to be--his own interests in rockets and spaceflight were
biasing his projections. He was advocating solutions to current
problems that were far more fantastical than practical. Heinlein was
certainly not alone in this. Many people looked at the atomic bomb
and made dire predictions that fortunately proved false. But
Heinlein believed in rocketry and spaceflight so fervently that it
led him to conclusions that were not well-grounded in the actual
technical realities of his day. That is worth considering today, six
decades later, when Heinlein is still held in such high esteem as a
prophet for the NewSpace movement.

"We are out of business..."

For most of World War 2, Heinlein worked as a civilian engineer on
aircraft programs for the Naval Air Experimental Station (NAES) at
the Naval Air Material Center, or NAMC, in Philadelphia. As the war
was obviously coming to a close he wrote this memo to the head
engineer at NAMC and then immediately resigned to return to private
life, where he not only went back to fiction writing, but like so
many intellectuals of his generation also concerned himself with the
politics of the bomb.

The memo is written in classic Heinleinian style--conversational,
not bureaucratic, and with a tone of overt cheerleading. It starts:

   I believe it is evident to any sober-minded technical man that
   the events of 6 Aug. 45... should cause us carefully to
   re-examine all plans, proposals, and projects which obtained
   before that time.

The preliminaries aside, he then made a bold statement:

   In the first place, in the broad sense we are out of business,
   just as thoroughly out of business as were wooden ships after the
   battle of the Monitor and the Merrimac. On the other hand we need
   not be out of business if we reorient, see what may be done with
   our exceptional resources in the way of trained personnel and
   mechanical equipment, and then determine what we should do in the
   interest of the United States of America in particular and
   humanity in general. What task is there for which we are fitted
   and which would serve the culture we are committed to support?

Heinlein then listed the specific reasons why he believed the world
had changed.

   Why we are out of business

   The atomic bomb is so overwhelmingly different from every
   previous weapon of war as to change the whole approach. I could
   expand that indefinitely but I am at loss for words--either a man
   sees it almost at once or he will never see it. But I will offer
   meager illustrations:

   No more surface warships.
   No more infantry.
   No more reciprocating engines in military aircraft.
   No more tanks.
   Every type of craft or weapon abolished or changed beyond
   recognition because of the incredible changes in logistics and
   tactics.
   Possibility of wars which last fifteen minutes instead of years.
   No more aircraft carriers --and all which that implies.
   It became quite evident at once that the greatest bomber in
   aviation history, the B-29, was not really up to the job of
   carrying the atomic bomb. It is much too slow, can't fly high
   enough, and is unnecessarily large. The atomic bomb should be
   carried by a rocket, manned or unmanned. Then the "parachute"
   would be unnecessary and the bomb could be placed with precision
   and with safety of the crew.

Heinlein's predictions about the future of weapons systems were of
course almost completely wrong. Surface warships, infantry, tanks,
aircraft carriers and even reciprocating engines in military
aircraft did not immediately disappear. Explaining why they did not
in the face of the atomic bomb would require many books, but at the
most basic level the issue was that the atomic bomb was soon viewed
as a weapon so terrible that it would not be regularly used. Even
while the United States held a nuclear monopoly, it did not drop
bombs on other nations. Because the bomb was essentially unusable,
all those other weapons were still necessary to fight the kinds of
wars that continued to occur, like Korea.

Heinlein was right about the B-29, but that observation was
self-evident. Clearly jets were the way of the future and what the
United States needed was a jet bomber, which it got a few years
later with the extraordinary B-47. But Heinlein's memo illuminates
his biases. Rather than jet bombers, Heinlein wanted ballistic
missiles.

  Heinlein's predictions about the future of weapons systems were of
  course almost completely wrong.

However, what Heinlein did not understand--undoubtedly because he
did not have access to any data about atomic weapons--was that
atomic bombs were heavy. In a sense the B-29 was not "unnecessarily
large" because it was the only plane then capable of carrying such a
large weapon. Lofting a weapon of that size atop a rocket would be
very difficult, something that Heinlein could not fully comprehend
because he did not have the data.

"We must ride the lightning and ride it well."

In the post-war period, Robert Heinlein devoted much time and effort
to prophesizing about how much the world had changed because of the
bomb. His outlook was grim: he thought that atomic conflict was
virtually inevitable. He was not alone in this; many intellectuals
felt the same way and even formed alliances such as the Federation
of American Scientists to try to influence policy. But in his 1945
memo, Heinlein is not so much advocating disarmament as sober
recognition of the new realities, as well as the need to embrace
high-tech warfare.

What should we do?

   This question needs to be approached with humility and with real
   desire to serve rather than simply with the idea of preserving a
   particular bureaucratic institution as a going concern. It may be
   conclusively assumed that, while war may possibly be successfully
   outlawed through the use or the threat of the use of the atomic
   bomb, the atomic bomb itself may no more be outlawed than sex or
   the silent stars. It's here, we've got it. It is a fait accompli.
   We must at all times be ready and willing to use it. If our
   culture is to survive we must contain that power with sober
   judgment and humanity. It is a simple fact that (1) we can not
   afford a war ever again, (2) the atomic bomb cannot be abolished,
   nor can it be indefinitely kept from other peoples. We must ride
   the lightning and ride it well. I conceive the atomic bomb as
   being the force behind the police power for a planetary peace.
   Perhaps the custodian will be called the "Armed Forces of the
   U.S." or perhaps the "Peace Forces of the United Nations,"--or
   perhaps another title. No matter, such a force there must be if
   we are not to be ourselves destroyed.

The idea of an international peacekeeping force was certainly in
vogue around that time. It had predated the war with Woodrow
Wilson's League of Nations, but the immense destruction of World War
2 lent it increased vigor, and the atomic bomb would soon add
momentum to the movement. Some groups even proposed that the United
States give up its atomic monopoly to an international force.

Heinlein then turned his attention to arming such a new entity and
argued that the organization that he had worked for during the war,
the Naval Air Materiel Command, could lead the way:

   I propose that NAMC undertake to develop a suitable passenger
   carrying rocket to be the "squad car" for the "planetary police."
   (No doubt the AAF [Army Air Forces] will tackle it also. Fine!)

   Nuclear physics is not our field. Craft which rise above the
   earth is our field. A new type is needed. Let's build it.

Perhaps realizing that his idea might be considered far-fetched,
Heinlein pointed to numerous wartime examples of rockets, including
the Japanese Oka rocket-powered suicide bomb, the V-2 rocket, and
recent developments in increasing rocket exhaust velocities. He also
explained that rockets were largely indifferent to weather because
they cruised beyond the atmosphere. Pressurization of the vehicle
for a crew should not be a problem and other technical developments
made a man-carrying rocket feasible.

   I propose a major project at NAF with numerous supporting
   projects at NAES to build such a rocket. A team should be set up
   consisting of a project engineer, several expert consultants
   (hired outside) engineers of many ratings including mechanical,
   ballistical, weight, electronic, and aero. The team should be
   large.

Heinlein then described in broad terms the steps needed to undertake
this effort. Eventually it would transform the NAMC. "We would end
up with a new and different organization... but we would end up with
a rocket."

But Heinlein was not naïve.

   It is possible that the open development of a military rocket
   will meet strong emotional opposition in the next few years. It
   might be more feasible in peace time to carry on this job, a job
   of pure research, by selecting an objective non-military in
   character but which would with utter certainty provide the
   military results as well. For example we might propose to build a
   messenger rocket to the moon.

This early effort would be a stunt with practical benefits. It
would:

   ...leave a mark (explosive dispersed carbon black, or similar
   dodge) on the face of the moon--a useless thing in itself but
   parallel to the 1st flight at Kitty Hawk, a conclusive
   demonstration that man can conquer space. The unique prestige
   which would accrue to the United States of America, to the U.S.
   Navy, and to NAMC in particular cannot be expressed. As an
   unpublicized side issue we would know how to build the perfect
   carrier for the A-bomb.

Heinlein proposed two types of rockets for discussion. One would be
a two-person "A-bomb rocket" that might have relatively short range
and have to be air-launched due to insufficiently powerful fuels.

The other was a

   ...Messenger Moon Rocket -- A two-stage job with a 50 lb.
   payload. It might be subjected to radio correction for the 1st
   1000 miles and thereafter controlled by a radar target seeker and
   a robot, set for the moon, and acting through cams out to this
   particular "problem of two bodies," but that would increase the
   original weight several fold and may not be necessary. I suggest
   that it be done even though unnecessary as it would automatically
   carry out several military projects necessary to the A-bomb
   carrier.

Heinlein also claimed that "It must be noted that it is really much
easier to build a successful Moon rocket than to build a proper war
rocket. Nevertheless either problem can be used to solve the
other--the choice between the two is a choice in diplomacy and
politics, not in engineering."

Heinlein then ended with a flourish.

   I could go on indefinitely. This is as good a place to stop as
   any. To you and my other colleagues, goodbye. I leave with very
   mixed emotions. If you get this project, I may be back, hat in
   hand, asking for a job!

Prophecies and realities

The US Navy did start studying rocket and space programs in the late
1940s. According to a paper from the 1980s by noted military space
historian R. Cargill Hall, these efforts originated outside of the
NAMC. They had nothing to do with Heinlein's memo. But eventually
the studies died out, whereas the Air Force continued conducting
more extensive studies of spaceflight and eventually started a
satellite program.

Heinlein was certainly a prophet, but sometimes prophets are ignored
and sometimes they are wrong.

The Navy also did not engage in significant ballistic missile
development in the immediate post-war years. The Air Force led in
that field as well--but slowly. To some extent Heinlein was right
about emotional opposition to ballistic missiles. But in the case of
the Air Force leadership was imprisoned by its own biases. For
approximately a decade after the war, the Air Force sought to
develop cruise missiles, believing that they were easier to perfect
than ballistic missiles. They were not easy to develop; their
guidance systems proved very challenging. But they had wings and Air
Force pilots understood wings. Ballistic missiles received far less
attention and money during this period.

But it is also true that the heavy weight of atomic weapons during
this period would have required a very large rocket to carry them.
The development of thermonuclear weapons changed the paradigm and
made intercontinental rockets conceivable. The Air Force then poured
money into the Atlas ICBM program and the shorter range Thor and by
the end of the 1950s the United States had its first long-range
ballistic missiles.

Heinlein was certainly a prophet, but sometimes prophets are ignored
and sometimes they are wrong. As we focus more attention on his
life, it will be a challenge to place him in the proper context of
the American space program.

Heinlein's original memo can be found here.

Acknowledgement: The author wishes to thank TK, Bill Patterson, and
Robert Kennedy. He also wishes to thank Eleanor Wood of Spectrum
Literary Agency and Arthur M. Dula of the Robert A. & Virginia
Heinlein Prize Trust for their kind permission to use the memo
discussed in this article.
   _______________________________________________________________

Dwayne A. Day has been a lifelong fan of Heinlein's fiction, if not
his prophecies. He hopes to someday lead the revolt of the lunar
colonies. He can be reached at zirconic at earthlink.net.