[tt] John Nicolay reviews Cairncross: The Death of Distance
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John Nicolay reviews Cairncross: The Death of Distance
Book review essay: Information technology
Nicolay, John A. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management. Hoboken:
Winter 1999.Vol.18, Iss. 1; pg. 156, 13 pgs
Abstract (Document Summary)
Nicolay reviews "The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution
Will Change Our Lives" by Frances Cairncross, "Waves of Power: The
Dynamics of Global Leadership, 1964-2010" by David Moschella, "The Digital
Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked Intelligence" by Donald
Tapscott, and others.
The Death of Distance: How the Communications Revolution Will Change
Our Lives, by Frances Cairncross. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business
School, 1997, 303 pp., $24.95 cloth.
Waves of Power: The Dynamics of Global Leadership, 1964-2010, by David
Moschella. New York: American Management Association, 1997, 290 pp.,
$29.95 cloth.
The Digital Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age of Networked
Intelligence, by Donald Tapscott. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997, 228 pp,
$14.95 paper.
Blueprint to the Digital Economy: Wealth Creation in the Era of
E-Business, edited by Donald Tapscott, Alex Lowy, and David Ticoll.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998, 384 pp., $24.95 cloth.
Leveraging the New Infrastructure: How Market Leaders Capitalize on
Information Technology, by Peter Weill and Marianne Broadbent.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1998, 336 pp., $29.95
cloth.
Within this review, five recent texts on the impacts of information
technologies on society and organization are examined. Each of these
texts teaches us something different about the emerging
technology-management context; each provides fertile ground for public
managers to ask the difficult policy questions regarding their
investments into information technologies. Without a map to the
future, strategic investments in technology may well be squandered.
The texts reviewed here take the reader from an appreciation of the
lessons learned in information technology investments toward a
discussion of how information technology will continue to invent the
organization and the people it serves.
We would fully expect no single text to supply a complete
understanding of the more particularistic concerns we might have as
public managers. Lessons derive from multiple texts. The vast majority
of these texts focus on private sector information technology
investments. Clearly, the authors whose books are discussed here have
the private sector/societal audience in mind. Consequently, as
managers with a public management orientation, we might ask of these
books questions they are not especially prepared to answer. Even so,
their presentations do anticipate our questions. Thus:
1. How can we as public managers determine the relationship between
costs and benefits with information technology investments?
2. What should be the orientation of organization to stakeholders when
designing the information technology infrastructure?
3. How have telecommunications hardware/software innovations shifted
the emphasis of service to clientele groups?
4. What can public managers anticipate as the next information
management models emerge? Does good planning circumvent future
miscalculations in investment and strategy?
5. Is there an information management orientation distinct from
traditional management approaches?
6. Can public management play a policy role in shaping the information
revolution?
To truly appreciate the revolutionary nature of information technology
management, there is wisdom in understanding the context of
information management. Without this understanding, public managers
might well be held captive to the lure of the technology itself, with
all the glowing promises technologists offer.
Although the fundamental practices of administration and management
remain largely locked into traditional patterns of decisionmaking, the
nearly blind allocation of vast resources into information
technologies has created an economy driven by these investments. There
appears to be little understanding of how these technologies will
fundamentally alter the manner in which the agencies purchasing them
will benefit, or to use the parlance, receive a return on their
investments. At the federal level, roughly 60 billion dollars were
spent in fiscal year 1997, half of those dollars within the Department
of Defense in weapons systems. The expectations of the Government
Performance and Results Act (1993), the Federal Workforce
Restructuring Act (1994) [see GAO, 1995], and the Information
Technology Management Reform Act (1997) promised that investments in
technology would pay tremendous dividends in agency response to
citizens, require fewer man-hours to produce them, and link all
government activities to outcomes-based performance measures [GAO,
1977b]
Realities often fall considerably short of ideals [GAO, 1997a]. But
returns on investment always tend to be slippery withing the public
realm, where so much of the work of one department or agency is in
service to another department or agency, and where old management
habits are hard to break ["Best IT Practices," 1997].
The question of whether information technologies are in and of
themselves a benefit to society generally, and to procuring agencies
in particular, cannot be easily answered. One learns quickly from
reading texts in this subject that much of determining value depends
on the point of view of the respondent and of the examiner.
Unfortunately, decisions to advance systems management with
investments generally have little to do with either a benefit to
society or to the agency. It is a catch-as-catch-can philosophy,
driven by the presence of a technology in the marketplace rather than
a specific need within the agency that a search for technology
resolves. Writers take both sides of the value question. Gene Rochlin
[1997] warns us that technologies can have unintended consequences,
among which are the reduction of the work life to a mechanistic
Tayloresque experience. Sherry Turkle [1995] speaks of the social
isolation through which individuals lose the checks society places on
human behavior. David Shenk [1997] questions how we can possibly
manage the deluge of information besetting our organizations. Other
writers have questioned the payback on technology investments such
that the imperative of owning technology far outweighs the pragmatism
dictated by sound management and practices [Landauer, 1996; Sichel,
1997.]
Bearing in mind the bipolar nature of these debates, the following
texts frame the questioned posed earlier.
Leveraging the New Infrastructure
The operational and financial analysis detailed by the authors of the
exceptional book Leveraging the New Infrastructure provides solid
groundwork upon which both public and private organizations may take a
hard look at their own approach to information technology procurement
and management. Weill and Broadbent premise their research upon the
principle that successful investments in information technologies must
return to those organizations enhanced products, services, and
strategic positioning within respective markets. Avoiding these
caveats, the investment will fail to achieve for the organization some
definition of success.
The organization that underappreciates the cost relationship for
information technology initiatives tied to specific organizational
processes and outcomes sets the course for economic disaster. Weill
and Broadbent argue for "the new infrastructure" such that external
and internal information technology environments serve to define for
the organization information architecture. The external information
technology is called the public infrastructure, by virtue of its use
in a wide variety of settings. The internal information technology is
called the firm's information technology infrastructure. The internal
infrastructure is centrally controlled and serves all divisions of the
organization. Clearly, strategic planning holds the key to successful
architectural design. This architecture represents the organization's
dynamic policies and standards for the use of all information
technologies through partnerships, for instance, hardware and software
vendors.
The design of the organization's information is too critical to be
either outsourced or left to the devices of technology specialists. A
common failing among senior executives results from the abdication or
delegation of the design and investment decisions. In their book,
Weill and Broadbent focus instead on a survey of private sector
companies whose information investments constitute a value-added
strategy for competitive advantage. They focus on 54 such companies
whose information portfolios-that sum of all aspects of the
information technology investment, including personnel-proved
successful. Case study illustrations punctuate the book.
The information technology portfolio addresses these objectives:
informational, strategic, transactional, and infrastructure. The
infrastructure reduces operational costs through standardization to
industry requirements. The transactional objective addresses the
routine process work of the industry. Strategic objectives of an
information portfolio allow decisionmakers to use the system for
tracking performance and projecting new avenues of growth.
Informational objectives provide for operational support. All four
aspects of the portfolio may be called into crafting an executive
decision. Hence, the balanced scorecard approach to a portfolio. The
balanced scorecard values each part of the information portfolio such
that each part is weighed to its contribution in the whole. An
alignment between the various contributions to this portfolio
constitutes a successful information technology investment.
The authors observed large organizations with many business units,
each serving a different function in the overall corporate design.
Each unit has different computing needs but operates from a single
system. The overall design of the system proves the critical element
in the first choice to invest. The most easily measured cost factor is
the repetitive, process-oriented operations. This transactional
investment represented "8 percent of centrally coordinated information
technology and 20 percent of business-unit investment, accounting for
12 percent of the [average] firm's total information technology
portfolio over five years" (p. 53). This investment in transactional
information technologies associates with a lower return on investment,
for the technology merely addresses the work already done, not the
strategic growth of the organization. The exception to this
observation is coupling information technology investments with
streamlining the organization. All the same we have this startling
observation: Downsizing does not impact revenue.
Informational technology investments are geared toward managing and
controlling the organization, such as with budget systems. On this
investment, the authors note, "Over the five years studied,
informational investment represented 14 percent of centrally
coordinated information technology investment and 18 percent of
business-unit investment, accounting for 16 percent of the average
firm's total information technology portfolio . . ." (p. 54). Such
investments appear attractive, given the emphasis on the accumulation
of information and the rapid response to database inquiries that an
abundance of information provides. But in and of itself, information
has no value. Value is derivative. In this study, the authors found no
relationship between the investment in informational technologies and
revenue returns. To add value, management must be able to react
quickly and decisively through that information.
Strategic investments in information technology are designed to serve
a competitive advantage. Such investments are not without risks. The
authors found that "strategic investment represented 8 percent of
centrally coordinated information technology investment and 24 percent
of business-unit investment, accounting for 14 percent of the total
portfolio" (p. 56). Of all the strategic investments studied, 50
percent of them failed. On the balance, successful strategic
investments have a short shelf life, less than three years. The major
contributing factor to these dismal returns was the lack of a firmwide
infrastructure, that is, strategic investments in technology tended to
be isolated from the firm's overall information system design. A
successful information technology investment requires an
enterprisewide approach to the design and implementation of the
technologies [Cook, 1996].
Technology infrastructure captures the most expensive information
technology investment. Much like a system of highways, technology
infrastructure demands standardization of computer applications,
hardware, and a networked design. The expense of these infrastructures
represents "70 percent of centrally coordinated information technology
investment and 38 percent of business-unit investment, accounting for
58 percent of the average firm's total portfolio" (p. 58). Because a
firmwide commitment to increasing infrastructure is complex, generally
requiring its own subunits of management and service, and expensive,
these firms demonstrate a higher rate of productivity and service, but
lower returns on investments. In other words, the cost associated with
a highly integrated, complex information technology easily outweigh
returns in the short run, but can dramatically increase profits in the
long run. This observation mirrors the economic analysis of computer
investments by Sichel [1997]. He calculated that technology capital
investments produced returns lower than traditional fund management
strategies.
One solution to risks and investment costs is outsourcing information
technology. Another text under review here picks up on this theme.
Laying aside the political economy value issues, for organizations in
which product turnaround time and product innovation were not issues,
outsourcing proved a significant plus. This clearly fits most public
organizations. The firm's capability in managing its information
technology investments or "conversion effectiveness" hinges on five
characteristics (top management commitment to information technology;
"less political turbulence"; more satisfied users; better planning;
and experience with information technologies), and these constitute a
major lesson of this text (p. 66).
Paradoxically, predicting information needs comes with little
experience within organizations whose success is predicated on
customer demands for information. Such demands often appear without
warning. For most agencies, shared resources present the most
promising alternative to constantly upgrading systems to meet these
demands. The paradox is thus: to be poised to meet customer demands
without a heavy investment in technologies for which there will be no
demand. The authors rehearse a model proposed by Peter Keen called
Reach and Range (p. 213). Reach refers to the networked capabilities
of an information infrastructure-such as a communication system. Range
refers to the ability of the infrastructure to provide all services to
all members within the system reach. This model creates a synergy
within the system that maximizes the use of that system across
clients. The process begins by identifying the needs of all system
users and identifying overlaps. The system operates with central
control.
Weill and Broadbent largely discount the value of business process
restructuring, such as that proposed by Hammer and Champy [1993].
Instead, successful companies benchmark their performance standards
against similar organizations, making changes incrementally based on
the organization's strategic posture and service reach. With direct
application to the public settings, the final lessons of the text
suggest that managers use the portfolio approach while evaluating the
risks of investment; integrate the portfolio with a clear
understanding of the maxims dictating organizational processes or
missions; outsource aspects of the process that are not an integral
part of the services performed by the organization; establish
indicators of success and assign responsibilities for achieving them;
manage the information infrastructure separately from other functions,
appraising and justifying its expense; manage system conversions such
that upgrading the system creates the least disruption and costs;
analyze the benefits of the system and learn from this experience;
manage the information politics, which means understanding why
information is important, how it is used, and the motivations of
people within the organization; create a transparent management system
such that all clients clearly see the governance process; and begin
with small investments, learning from that experience.
Management of information technologies cannot be apportioned and
discarded. The authors' "Management by Maxim" understands that each
member of the organization plays a part in the overall success of that
organization. Now and into the future, "the quality of executive
leadership for the new infrastructure [is] a source of competitive
differentiation" (p. 254).
This book represents important field research in an arena with so
little to offer in balance. The authors conducted extensive
examinations for returns on investment within their sample, isolating
those variables that appear to have contributed to overall corporate
financial success. This sample should be construed as neither random
nor representative of corporate attitudes toward technology
investments. A recent survey by A. T. Kearney found that 70 percent of
the businesses it surveyed did not consider information technology
(IT) and data management as critical to their success [Caldwell,
McGee, and Wilder, 1998].
To frame success the authors are on the right track. An earlier work
by Mellissa Cook [1996] demonstrates the power of the enterprise model
of information systems. Cooks' book explores the pioneering
theoretical work of John Zachman. The Zachman model argues-as have
these authors-that an information system affects the entire
organization. Smart design involves all sectors of the organization.
Each contributes to the overall design through the lens of experience.
Hence, system analysts bring into the design the global and strategic
perspective of the top management, as well as the operational
perspective of those who use the system on a daily basis, and
ultimately the consumers. Programmers and system engineers design the
architecture and eventually write the code, but their work is
secondary to the system design produced through the internal
understanding of the organization's information needs. Readers of the
Weill and Broadbent analysis will appreciate a foundation in
enterprise design prior to an application of their principles. Public
managers can learn much through the identification of critical success
elements and the role of outsourcing with information technologies.
The Digital Economy
With several titles to his credit-most recently the edited Blueprint
to the Digital Economy [Tapscott, Lowy, and Ticoll, 1998]-technology
managers regard Don Tapscott as a leading conversant in the emerging
literatures of information technology management and economics. To
date, his best received book has been Paradigm Shift [Tapscott and
Caston, 1992]. In Digital Economy Tapscott supplies his readers with a
sequence of lists (to which even this analyst succumbs) through which
he details the emergence of a new world economy anchored to
information technologies and what the emergence portends for
individuals and for organizations.
Every aspect of the postindustrial, information-based economies has
effects on individuals and consequently the choices these individuals
make. Acknowledging a theme woven through all the review texts
Tapscott is clearest: Only those individuals and organizations posed
to take advantage of technologies in defining skills and processes
will succeed. The emerging economies are highly integrated, driven by
the micro encapsulation of the integrated circuit, which makes the new
technologies easily portable and easily produced. Every learned
individual can generate computer applications tailored to the needs of
the organization.
Learning and working are no longer separate exercises [see Reich,
1992]. The information age requires that workers continually be
learners, and there is an integration of these once two distinct
activities. Once individuals acquired knowledge to work. Now, in order
to work, individuals commit to a life-long learning experience. Just
as information technologies transform education, digitization causes
the computing, communications, and content industries to collide.
Recent complaints regarding the dominance of Microsoft in setting
software standards speaks to the reduction of contenders in these
three industries. Concurrently, we have seen representatives from
these three industries create partnerships to provide new services,
for instance Microsoft and Boeing's partnership to establish a global
communication satellite network.
Hierarchical leadership dissolves into a learning leadership that
advances partnerships for learning both intra- and interorganization
[see Senge, 1994]. Tapscott views these partnerships as collective or
internetworked leaders. Partnership leaders can be digital. The role
of the executive finds itself diminished.
Finally, information technologies increase quality of life through
opportunities for more enriching work, both physically and
financially. The drudgeries associated with blue-collar labor have
nearly dissipated in America with over 60 percent of the workforce now
engaged in information-based jobs. Individuals leaving college today
can well expect a commitment to a lifetime of learning and divergent
professional responsibilities.
Anyone familiar with the "urgency" literature of information
management will likely regard Tapscott as yet another voice in the
throng. Perhaps Tapscott's reputation as a keynote speaker precedes
the essays, for the essays take on that tone. The target reading
population for this book is clearly the academic market, but
novitiates into information technology management, or generalists
looking for a management inspiration, will much enjoy this book.
Tapscott's most recent publication foray is the Blueprint to the
Digital Economy: Creating Wealth in the Era of E-Business (1998). This
collection of 20 exoteric essays touches on a range of issues, from
banking to cyberspace. Each essay is written by a representative-often
industry leaders-of a major player in the electronic forums. Public
managers will find the four essays on governance the most productive,
especially as they think through the necessity of a presence in the
networked world of the Internet. Having read these treatments, readers
should regard with some caution how they approach their Internet
content, and again, wonder whether citizens are best served in all
instances with the Internet alternative to public discourse and
commerce. As currently configured, the Internet dispenses with the
messiness of irate citizens and allows agencies to put forward their
best foot to the dance.
Educators will find Carol Twigg and Michael Miloff's essay "The Global
Learning Infrastructure: The Future of Higher Education" a concise and
well-reasoned argument for distance learning. Although no one can
rationally expect the campus to disappear in the near term, the hunger
for "knowledge on demand" and the intellectual resource management
power of the Internet-say with up-to-date publishing-has in fact
changed the nature of secondary education in America, a system nearly
everyone agrees faces a monumental crisis.
This book provides excellent summaries of how information technologies
affect the pedestrian lives of individuals and industries. Readers
unsatiated in their desire to learn more about the transformations
taking place in the pedestrian worlds through which we travel-banking
and entertainment, for example-will find this collection rewarding and
insightful.
Given Tapscott's reputation as an expert in information technologies,
his essays warrant scrutiny by policy managers. Especially engaging is
the discussion on networked management, and how electronic information
has altered the nature of hierarchical power schemes.
Waves of Power
As a senior vice president of research at the trade journal
Computerworld, David Moschella finds himself in the enviable position
of having matured as a commentator on the information revolution. He
writes of a coming convergence of the 4Cs- computers, communications,
consumer electronics, and content. Each of these Cs represents a wave,
engulfing all previously held assumptions about commerce. This
prophetic book comes the closest to acknowledging the urgency of
making information technology a focus of managerial studies and
practice. Failing to define for ourselves the role that information
technologies will play in how we construct our agencies surrenders
that role to forces beyond our agencies. This lesson alone makes this
book an important read for public managers.
Moschella creates a four-epoch schematic to frame the IT industry
evolution: systems-centric, 1964-1981; PC-centric, 1981-1994;
network-centric, 1994-2005; and content-centric, 2005-2015. All but
the last have emerged as a result of shifts in information
hardware/software technology. For each of the first three epochs,
Moschella provides a concise historical overview, underscoring the
role that key industries have played in shaping that period of the
information technology evolution. The key to understanding the last
epoch is global economics and the exhaustion of dramatic technology
innovations. Each of these waves builds slowly in general application
of the technology, enjoys frenetic ascent to plateau, then declines as
newer forms of technology emerge and gain acceptance in the workplace.
Except for the main frame era, which is still with us although to be
largely resolved with the 2000 crisis, these epochs enjoy but a
decennial shelf life.
Most information management readers are comfortable with the history
and players of the systems-centric, PC-centric, and network-centric
epochs. Of the first, clearly IBM played the central role, a role
which it surrendered through a monumental miscalculation of the
emerging personal computer paradigm, that is a shift from corporate
computing to individual computing. Two innovations made this possible:
the integrated circuit and the software for the operating system.
Among the software vendors, the battle was for standards. Moschella
writes "the real change was the move away from a world where standards
were set by vertically integrated systems vendors toward one where
they were set by vendors who concentrated on particular parts of the
industry value chain" (p. 17).
The vertically integrated systems vendors-such as Apple Computers-were
in fact done in by the demand for standards. Software vendors such as
Microsoft wielded the ax. The theoretical work of Michael Porter
[1990] set the stage for global competition by recognizing that
competition requires a unique approach to product development, skills,
integrated industrial support, consumer demand setting high
expectations, and rivalry among similarly posed companies. No less can
be said for the public sector, including higher education.
The Microsoft story often bears repeating, but Moschella avoids the
common temptation of the great man characterizations in the successful
emergence of the information technologies. Instead, the emphasis
throughout the book is to regard these emergences as the natural and
logical sequence through which these stories must be told. The
technological "waves" are borne on forces greater than personality. It
is the story of standards. Through standards-horizontal
integration-new commodities emerged. The dominant players in the
second epoch are Microsoft (software), Intel (hardware), and Novell
(networks). The wedding of Microsoft to Intel, generally referred to
as Wintel, proved as short-lived as many marriages, and the marital
battle in the network era became Novell-operating through a Unix
environment and Windows NT.
To focus on the Goliaths misses the true innovation and revolution in
service support: consulting, design, implementation, training and
ancillary support services, system maintenance, organization
operations, and outsourcing (p. 73). Each of the preceding generations
of information technologies surrounds itself with a cadre of
specializations geared entirely toward keeping that system functional.
To bring forth the metaphor of the wave, no previous wave completely
disintegrates before the next wave begins. It is this process of
disintegration that has proven a financial windfall for a great many
support services. Just as Microsoft and Intel enjoy a phenomenal
market success, Moschella argues that they are but crescendos of the
wave, gathering force, then dissipating as the new momentum engulfs
it.
By 1994, the third wave emerged: a network-centric world. Obviously,
the most common application of network-centric must be the role played
by the Internet in providing communication passages for desktop PCs to
the global community of shared information resources. A number of
principles guide this epoch: a dramatic reduction in return of
investment over cost of development; communications bandwidth, freed
by changing Federal Communication Commission (FCC) control over the
allocation of bandwidth to consumers; virtual communities; electronic
commerce; and a convergence of industrial value chains across economic
sectors (p. 100). If the desktop computer offered consumers only a
neater way to type letters, it would have fallen quickly into the
realm of appliance. It was the creation of local area networks and
wide area networks that transformed this box into a powerhouse of
connectivity, making possible the instantaneous freedom of electronic
mail, shared computing between agencies and individuals, and the
garnering of information from any location in the world.
The economics of computing have changed. Software and hardware costs,
once the barrier to general access, have fallen so dramatically that
the network's marginal value has likewise increased in value. The
federal government's Advanced Research Projects Administration
invested heavily in the design of network standards [Norberg and
O'Neill, 1996]. By the 1980s, the public investment and government
leadership had largely dissipated. The private sector produces the
innovations, testing them through the whim of the market, driven by
the voracious, and unpredicted, appetite of people and organizations
for connectivity.
The network-centric wave consists of four major industries: computers,
communications, consumer electronics, and content using graphics. Of
the four, only communications continues to be heavily regulated in
this country. Moschella argues that freeing it from regulation will in
turn free the four to converge. Industry giants such as Microsoft will
form alliances that contain all elements of these industries. When
Microsoft joined forces with NBC, it was the convergence of computer
hardware, television communication, the television itself, and the
content of NBC. Web television through cable companies such as TCI
with the software of Internet providers mixes dynamic and eclectic
information resources with a specific broadcast content. The hurdle of
bandwidth will diminish and along with it the separate market
identifications. As the bandwidth problems resolve, so too will the
role played by hardware/software vendors. The real winner in the
network-centric wave will be the telecommunication companies. The real
advances in networks will be in how we are connected. Proprietary
ownership of a specific application or a specific central processor
succumbs to the value of the network-centric environment. It is an
environment in which content, and how that content presents itself to
consumers, will dictate the fourth wave.
Moschella avoids the trap that many futurists face: having to witness
firsthand the hubris of prognostication. He devotes a short discussion
to the fourth wave. Moschella limits this discussion to the obvious.
The world will continue to hardwire itself, and advances will surely
be made in quality of content and speed of transmission. The bigger
questions, and again Moschella avoids lengthy discussion of these
difficult, seemingly intractable issues, are political. He reminds us
of the role a government plays in defining content, regulating
information use, and creating access to it. We run the risk of
bifurcating our societies further in "have technology" and "have-not
technology." After a short review of the largely exaggerated claims of
Vice President Gore and Speaker Gingrich on the reformation besetting
Americans for democratic and intellectual commerce, Moschella reminds
us-as stolen for the introduction to this review-that the policy
questions are the most difficult, and these questions frame the very
existence of a content-centric fourth wave.
Moschella's account of the emergence and growth of the information
technologies as a series of waves, or paradigms-a term he uses
sparingly-serves two useful purposes: a concise review of the markets
and industrial players defining each wave; and a cautionary tale on
the limits of public policy to meaningfully address the concerns of a
people undergoing radical social transformation. Clearly, the polemics
of reinvention fall short of the long-term implications of a society
socially fragmented, economically stratified, and divested of historic
avenues for participating in the changes confronting it. The book is
well written, well documented, and soundly argued from the perspective
of technology innovations. The major shortcoming for public managers
will be the brief treatment of government's role in managing the final
transformation discussed. Believing that the world's cultures and
economies will converge in the fourth wave seems simplistic at best,
and naive. Indeed, one can fully expect that the hardest questions
regarding content management have yet to be tested.
As public managers, clearly we should be alarmed. But we are not.
The Death of Distance
Recently, the third largest telephone company in America, Sprint,
announced a bold initiative to link all communication media beneath
the penumbra of a single networked system. Named Integrated On-Demand
Network, this startling news seemed to fulfill much of what this book
is about: the harnessing of all technologies into a seamless
integrated network [Kujubu, 1998].
Of the authors reviewed here, Cairncross strays much deeper into the
forecast of how information technologies, most notably communication
technologies of which she considers the former a subset in the broader
perspective, will evolve over the next few years. On the surface, the
arguments compel us to consider, in the words of AT&T chairman Robert
Allen, that "something startling, intriguing, and profound is afoot"
(as quoted, p. 2). So it is, but, as with Moschella, we lack in these
assessments the harder question of how the cultures and economies of
the world will converge into a dynamic community of mutuality.
Suffering then the polemic, readers should approach this book with the
hopeful anticipation of a child on Christmas morn. You do not always
get what you ask for.
The case begins with a review of the history of the television and the
telephone, and the adoption rates for these technologies followed by
their impact on macro economics, notably the dramatic decrease in the
cost of use and the increase in services provided. In the future,
Cairncross expects to see revenue structures for phone companies to
mimic the subscription fee schedules such as those used for Internet
access. Deregulation of the telephone companies, she suggests, will
diminish the influence of the big companies and create investment
opportunities for smaller service providers in a global market.
Innovation will continue, especially for wireless communication, the
fastest growing telephonic market segment, and the use of
communication satellites to track commerce. The pressure placed on
telephone providers to increase capacity has lead to an upsurge in the
installation of second lines. Alternatively, had Cairncross known of
it, Sprint's On-Demand system promises to solve the bandwidth problems
associated with the Internet, especially with video transmissions, by
rewiring America with fiber-optic lines. AT&T's pending merger with
TCI provides a second alternative through coaxial cables and market
dominance.
Cairncross correctly notes that the cost of installing fiber-optic
lines to every home in America remains daunting. Fiber optics are wed
to the Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN). The ISDN will
continue to be the choice of the near future. The alternative copper
wire technology of Asymmetric Digital Subscriber Lines, which can
carry up to 100 times the volume of ISDN, is still too expensive to
justify its use. With ISDN technology, developing countries have the
advantage. Having no major telecommunications infrastructure, they can
install fiber optics. Solving the connectivity problem, however, does
not solve the content problem.
The challenge for television broadcasters will be to continue to
develop content that people will watch, then to find ways of
extracting revenue from viewers. For most of the world, programming is
a U.S. export, a situation likely to change. Innovations in
broadcasting services, such as Web Tv-allowing viewers to plug into
the Internet as they watch-have received tremendous advance reviews,
but the industry remains uncertain about how to capitalize on this
feature given the subscription fee access that Americans now enjoy
with unlimited usage. Cairncross expects us to remain passive viewers
with little interest in a television that requires of us some form of
interaction other than surfing channels.
The forecasts for Internet use exhibit the wild success of this
information technology with an expectation that the growth will shift
from astronomical to astounding (p.89). As noted by Tapscott, the
attendant growth in support technologies will continue. Cairncross
also believes that the basic "public property" premise of the Internet
and its cross-computing platforms standards sets it apart from other
forms of telecommunication. Open standards, a necessity of networked
communications arising from the early days of Department of Defense
research support, still vexes Internet content developers, especially
in the area of video. The Internet costs less because of the
subscription fee schedules Internet Server Providers (ISPs) charge
consumers, and the fees charged to ISPs by telephone companies.
The Internet offers commercial services bound to grow: online banking,
shopping, contracting for services, and investment. These are nicely
discussed in the recent Tapscott collection. But there are problems.
International communities will likely strongly react to the strong
America flavor of Internet content. Further, if only roughly 20
percent of the American population have easy access to Internet
services, the vast majority of Americans will continue to rely on
conventional routes for information gathering and consumption. Nor
does this bode well for democratic discourse, despite the
high-spirited political comment. The big winners now, and into the
near future, will be commercial applications between business and
governments, and those homogenous industrial countries with near
100-percent connectivity.
The cultural aspects of a public information source challenge Congress
and most international communities, where restrictions vary widely on
access to content. In Sweden, for example, ownership of child
pornography is sanctioned. In Israel, Orthodox Jews have their own
Internet system that excludes materials considered to undermine the
faith. In many Arab countries, a woman seen in a bikini violates
custom and law. The failed effort in the United States to curb access
to materials considered unsuitable for minors can only mimic efforts
to control information around the world as the Internet is presently
configured. How these public debates will embrace world differences is
not approached in this text.
In the main, this is an excellent, well-researched, and well-written
treatment of the communication industries for general readers. These
readers will appreciate the analysis and straightforward language of
the text. Readers attuned to the fluid nature of corporate
communication alliances-the proposed merger of AT&T and TCI diffuses
one argument in this text-will find the discussion largely
superficial. The book lacks depth of appreciation for the dynamic
nature of technological innovation and fails to anticipate major
shifts in market strategy, most notably, the Sprint On-Demand Network
which, if it materializes, will revolutionize telecommunications. In
fact, rather than increased global competition, we can well expect to
se fewer players on the significant fields. Nor will public managers
find themselves better positioned to deal with the difficult questions
of content, anticipating technology, or if concerned, furthering
opportunities to deliver services to citizens and bringing citizens
into the democratic fold.
Conclusion
This review examined five solutions to paring the impressive reading
list of this field through five treatments of information technology
that share much-namely, a common structure from which to diverge-while
presenting a refined interpretation of that broad topic. Weill,
Broadbent, and Tapscott argue for a management perspective that takes
advantage of information technologies in a strategic environment.
Their perspective argues for a total enterprise immersion into the
benefits and shortcomings of these technologies, and a caution.
Investment succeeds where the potential is understood and the
workforce educated to its use. These texts offer generalists
compelling managerial frames and set forth the rhetorical questions
each organization must ask itself prior to the grand leap of faith
into the promised land.
Moschella and Cairncross tell a different story. At first, we have a
well-rehearsed tale of the emergence of information technologies, the
former from the perspective of information technology industrial
leaders and their convergences as the market narrows around them, and
the latter from the perspective of global communications and how
leadership in this arena spells a new kind of victory of western
technological innovation. The more powerful subtext, and one which
every organization must face, is this: Where will we be in the next 10
years, and how will we define for ourselves the role that these
technologies will play in shaping our historic missions and purposes?
For public managers, no argument is more urgent.
The lack of depth in examining political and administrative issues
undermines each of these texts, hence short-shifting the federal
agencies engaged in developing communication standards-a work into
which the Advanced Research Projects Administration (ARPA) still
invests billions. Also missing in the balance are the struggles of the
FCC: a fee-based structure through which the telephone companies can
garner additional revenues from Internet users: citizen privacy;
encryption; and a myriad of other pressing titles.
This review began with an identification of six issues worthy of
public management consideration. To proceed from the general to the
specific, public managers can benefit tremendously from a careful
review and study of the wonderful resources available through our
federal agencies, notably the General Accounting Office
(http://www.gao.gov), the General Services Administration
(http://www.gsa.gov), and the homepages of the Chief Information
Officers Council (http://cio.gov). The references to this review
identify a few of the more useful resources available.
[Reference]
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JOHN A. NICOLAY is Professor of Public Administration at Troy State
University, Florida.
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