[tt] CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15, 2007
Eugen Leitl
<eugen at leitl.org> on
Wed Aug 15 12:04:28 UTC 2007
----- Forwarded message from Bruce Schneier <schneier at SCHNEIER.COM> -----
From: Bruce Schneier <schneier at SCHNEIER.COM>
Date: Wed, 15 Aug 2007 03:34:56 -0500
To: CRYPTO-GRAM-LIST at LISTSERV.MODWEST.COM
Subject: CRYPTO-GRAM, August 15, 2007
User-Agent: Thunderbird 1.5.0.12 (Windows/20070509)
Reply-To: Bruce Schneier <schneier at SCHNEIER.COM>
CRYPTO-GRAM
August 15, 2007
by Bruce Schneier
Founder and CTO
BT Counterpane
schneier at schneier.com
http://www.schneier.com
http://www.counterpane.com
A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.
For back issues, or to subscribe, visit
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.
You can read this issue on the web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0807.html>. These same essays
appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog:
<http://www.schneier.com/blog>. An RSS feed is available.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
In this issue:
Assurance
More Voting News
New Harry Potter Book Leaked on BitTorrent
News
Avian Flu and Disaster Planning
TSA Warns of Terrorist Dry Runs
Security-Theater Cameras Coming to New York
Schneier/BT Counterpane News
Airport Security Breach
Details on the U.K. Liquid Terrorist Plot
House of Lords on Computer Security
Conversation with Kip Hawley
Comments from Readers
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Assurance
Over the past several months, the state of California conducted the most
comprehensive security review yet of electronic voting machines. People
I consider to be security experts analyzed machines from three different
manufacturers, performing both a red-team attack analysis and a detailed
source code review. Serious flaws were discovered in all machines and,
as a result, the machines were all decertified for use in California
elections.
The reports are worth reading, as is much of the commentary on the
topic. The reviewers were given an unrealistic timetable and had trouble
getting needed documentation. The fact that major security
vulnerabilities were found in all machines is a testament to how poorly
they were designed, not to the thoroughness of the analysis. Yet
California Secretary of State Debra Bowen has conditionally recertified
the machines for use, as long as the makers fix the discovered
vulnerabilities and adhere to a lengthy list of security requirements
designed to limit future security breaches and failures.
While this is a good effort, it has security completely backward. It
begins with a presumption of security: If there are no known
vulnerabilities, the system must be secure. If there is a vulnerability,
then once it's fixed, the system is again secure. How anyone comes to
this presumption is a mystery to me. Is there any version of any
operating system anywhere where the last security bug was found and
fixed? Is there a major piece of software anywhere that has been, and
continues to be, vulnerability-free?
Yet again and again we react with surprise when a system has a
vulnerability. Last weekend at the hacker convention DefCon, I saw new
attacks against supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems
-- those are embedded control systems found in infrastructure systems
like fuel pipelines and power transmission facilities -- electronic
badge-entry systems, MySpace, and the high-security locks used in places
like the White House. I will guarantee you that the manufacturers of
these systems all claimed they were secure, and that their customers
believed them.
Earlier this month, the government disclosed that the computer system of
the US-Visit border control system is full of security holes. Weaknesses
existed in all control areas and computing device types reviewed, the
report said. How exactly is this different from any large government
database? I'm not surprised that the system is so insecure; I'm
surprised that anyone is surprised.
We've been assured again and again that RFID passports are secure. When
researcher Lukas Grunwald successfully cloned one last year at DefCon,
industry experts told us there was little risk. This year, Grunwald
revealed that he could use a cloned passport chip to sabotage passport
readers. Government officials are again downplaying the significance of
this result, although Grunwald speculates that this or another similar
vulnerability could be used to take over passport readers and force them
to accept fraudulent passports. Anyone care to guess who's more likely
to be right?
It's all backward. Insecurity is the norm. If any system -- whether a
voting machine, operating system, database, badge-entry system, RFID
passport system, etc. -- is ever built completely vulnerability-free,
it'll be the first time in the history of mankind. It's not a good bet.
Once you stop thinking about security backward, you immediately
understand why the current software security paradigm of patching
doesn't make us any more secure. If vulnerabilities are so common,
finding a few doesn't materially reduce the quantity remaining. A system
with 100 patched vulnerabilities isn't more secure than a system with
10, nor is it less secure. A patched buffer overflow doesn't mean that
there's one less way attackers can get into your system; it means that
your design process was so lousy that it permitted buffer overflows, and
there are probably thousands more lurking in your code.
Diebold Election Systems has patched a certain vulnerability in its
voting-machine software twice, and each patch contained another
vulnerability. Don't tell me it's my job to find another vulnerability
in the third patch; it's Diebold's job to convince me it has finally
learned how to patch vulnerabilities properly.
Several years ago, former National Security Agency technical director
Brian Snow began talking about the concept of "assurance" in security.
Snow, who spent 35 years at the NSA building systems at security levels
far higher than anything the commercial world deals with, told audiences
that the agency couldn't use modern commercial systems with their
backward security thinking. Assurance was his antidote:
"Assurances are confidence-building activities demonstrating that:
"1. The system's security policy is internally consistent and reflects
the requirements of the organization,
"2. There are sufficient security functions to support the security policy,
"3. The system functions to meet a desired set of properties and *only*
those properties,
"4. The functions are implemented correctly, and
"5. The assurances *hold up* through the manufacturing, delivery and
life cycle of the system."
Basically, demonstrate that your system is secure, because I'm just not
going to believe you otherwise.
Assurance is less about developing new security techniques than about
using the ones we have. It's all the things described in books like
"Building Secure Software," "Software Security," and "Writing Secure
Code." It's some of what Microsoft is trying to do with its Security
Development Lifecycle (SDL). It's the Department of Homeland Security's
Build Security In program. It's what every aircraft manufacturer goes
through before it puts a piece of software in a critical role on an
aircraft. It's what the NSA demands before it purchases a piece of
security equipment. As an industry, we know how to provide security
assurance in software and systems; we just tend not to bother.
And most of the time, we don't care. Commercial software, as insecure as
it is, is good enough for most purposes. And while backward security is
more expensive over the life cycle of the software, it's cheaper where
it counts: at the beginning. Most software companies are short-term
smart to ignore the cost of never-ending patching, even though it's
long-term dumb.
Assurance is expensive, in terms of money and time for both the process
and the documentation. But the NSA needs assurance for critical military
systems; Boeing needs it for its avionics. And the government needs it
more and more: for voting machines, for databases entrusted with our
personal information, for electronic passports, for communications
systems, for the computers and systems controlling our critical
infrastructure. Assurance requirements should be common in IT contracts,
not rare. It's time we stopped thinking backward and pretending that
computers are secure until proven otherwise.
California reports:
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm
Commentary and blog posts:
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1181
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/07/ca-releases-res.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/california_voti.html
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1184
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/ca-releases-sou.html
http://avi-rubin.blogspot.com/2007/08/california-source-code-study-results.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2bz7ks
http://www.crypto.com/blog/ca_voting_report/
http://twistedphysics.typepad.com/cocktail_party_physics/2007/08/caveat-voter.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2737c7
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/08/more_on_the_cal.html
California's recertification requirements:
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070806-california-to-recertify-insecure-voting-machines.html
or http://tinyurl.com/ytesbj
DefCon reports:
http://www.defcon.org/
http://www.physorg.com/news105533409.html
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/open-sesame-acc.html
http://www.newsfactor.com/news/Social-Networking-Sites-Are-Vulnerable/story.xhtml?story_id=012000EW8420
or http://tinyurl.com/22uoza
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/08/jennalynn-a-12-.html
US-VISIT database vulnerabilities:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/02/AR2007080202260.html
or http://tinyurl.com/33cglf
RFID passport hacking:
http://www.engadget.com/2006/08/03/german-hackers-clone-rfid-e-passports/
or http://tinyurl.com/sy439
http://www.rfidjournal.com/article/articleview/2559/2/1/
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/epassport
http://money.cnn.com/2007/08/03/news/rfid/?postversion=2007080314
How common are bugs:
http://www.rtfm.com/bugrate.pdf
Diebold patch:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/08/florida_evoting.html
Brian Snow on assurance:
http://www.acsac.org/2005/papers/Snow.pdf
Books on secure software development:
http://www.amazon.com/Building-Secure-Software-Security-Problems/dp/020172152X/ref=counterpane/
or http://tinyurl.com/28p4hu
http://www.amazon.com/Software-Security-Building-Addison-Wesley/dp/0321356705/ref=counterpane/
or http://tinyurl.com/ypkkwk
http://www.amazon.com/Writing-Secure-Second-Michael-Howard/dp/0735617228/ref=counterpane/
or http://tinyurl.com/2f5mdt
Microsoft's SDL:
http://www.microsoft.com/MSPress/books/8753.asp
DHS's Build Security In program:
https://buildsecurityin.us-cert.gov/daisy/bsi/home.html
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/08/securitymatters_0809
or http://tinyurl.com/2nyo8c
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
More Voting News
California Secretary of State Bowen's certification decisions are
online. She has totally decertified the ES&S Inkavote Plus system, used
in L.A. County, because of ES&S noncompliance with the Top to Bottom
Review. The Diebold and Sequoia systems have been decertified and
conditionally recertified. The same was done with one Hart Intercivic
system (system 6.2.1). (Certification of the Hart system 6.1 was
voluntarily withdrawn.) To those who thought she was staging this
review as security theater, this seems like evidence to the contrary.
She wants to do the right thing, but has no idea how to conduct a
security review.
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/elections_vsr.htm
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/05/us/05vote.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1186287020-khO/ehBMuFtZIyeXCC4wHg
or http://tinyurl.com/yto8ss
Florida just recently released another study of the Diebold voting
machines. They -- and it was real security researchers like the
California study, and not posers -- studied v4.6.5 of the Diebold TSx
and v1.96.8 of the Diebold Optical Scan. (California studied older
versions (v4.6.4 of the TSx and v1.96.6 of the Optical Scan).
http://www.sait.fsu.edu/news/2007-07-31.shtml
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/pdf/SAITreport.pdf
The most interesting issues are (1) Diebold's apparent "find-then-patch"
approach to computer security, and (2) Diebold's lousy use of
cryptography. More here:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/08/florida_evoting.html
The UK Electoral Commission released a report on the 2007 e-voting and
e-counting pilots. The results are none too good.
http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/elections/pilotsmay2007.cfm
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/08/02/electoral-commission-releases-e-voting-and-e-counting-reports
or http://tinyurl.com/yukeot
And the Brennan Center released a report on post-election audits:
http://www.brennancenter.org/dynamic/subpages/download_file_50089.pdf
My previous essays on electronic voting, from 2004:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0411.html#1
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0411.html#2
My previous essay on electronic voting, from 2000:
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0012.html#1
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
New Harry Potter Book Leaked on BitTorrent
A week before publication, digital photographs of every page were
available on BitTorrent.
I fielded a lot of press calls on this, mostly from reporters asking me
what the publisher could have done differently. Honestly, I don't think
it was possible to keep the book under wraps. Millions of copies of the
book were headed to all four corners of the globe. There were simply
too many people who must be trusted in order for the security to hold.
And all it took was one untrustworthy person -- one truck driver, one
bookstore owner, one warehouse worker -- to leak the book.
But conversely, I don't think the publishers should care. Anyone
fan-crazed enough to read digital photographs of the pages a few days
before the real copy comes out is also someone who is going to buy a
real copy. And anyone who will read the digital photographs *instead*
of the real book would have borrowed a copy from a friend. My guess is
that the publishers lost zero sales, and that the pre-release simply
increased the press frenzy.
I'm kind of amazed the book hadn't leaked sooner.
And that was just the first leak. Shortly thereafter, versions in Word,
plain text, and formatted PDF were likewise available via BitTorrent.
http://machinist.salon.com/blog/2007/07/17/potter_leaked/
http://www.publicradio.org/columns/futuretense/
Some of the security measures the publisher took with the manuscript.
http://www.crn.com.au/story.aspx?CIID=86846&src=site-marq
The camera has a unique serial number embedded in each of the digital
photos which might be used to track the author.
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070723-harry-potter-and-the-serial-number-of-doom.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2ymfwe
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/the_future_of_p.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
News
Interesting essay on security and return on investment (ROI):
http://taosecurity.blogspot.com/2007/07/no-roi-no-problem.html
In this article about a do-it-yourself anti-satellite missile system,
this bit of reality only appears at the end: "While it may be true
that, when it comes to nuts and bolts, things may not be quite as simple
as they sound here, the bare fact remains -- it can be done."
http://www.spacewar.com/reports/DIY_Anti_Satellite_System_999.html
Here's a clip from an Australian TV programme called "The Chaser". A
Trojan Horse (full of appropriately attired soldiers) finds its way past
security everywhere except the Turkish consulate. At least they
remember their history.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xs3SfNANtig
Some common sense from Canada: passengers are once again allowed to say
"bomb" in the airport.
http://www.reuters.com/article/oddlyEnoughNews/idUSKUA25254620070712
"Hut 33": a new BBC Radio comedy about three codebreakers in World War
II Bletchley Park:
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/comedy/hut33.shtml
In London, the system that was built for road-fare collection is now
being used for counterterrorism. This sort of function creep happens
all the time. I'll bet you anything that, soon after this data is used
for antiterrorism purposes, more exceptions are put in place for more
routine police matters.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6902543.stm
Woman registers a dog to vote. No word about whether or not the dog
would have actually been able to vote.
http://timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?storyID=600259&category=Strange%20News&BCCode=STRANGENEWS&newsdate=7/13/2007
or http://tinyurl.com/2266oz
http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/?p=1172
Most computer security products deliberately do not detect police spyware.
http://news.com.com/Will+security+firms+detect+police+spyware/2100-7348_3-6197020.html?tag=nefd.lede
or http://tinyurl.com/25x2uj
A TSA screener doesn't like the look of a homemade battery charger, and
refuses to let it on an airplane. Interesting story, both for the
escalation procedure the TSA screener followed, and the author's
observation. Basically, people with no expertise in what's normal are
being asked to determine what's normal. Something that's allowed one
time might not be allowed the next. And that's the problem: the TSA is
both arbitrary and capricious, and it's impossible to follow the rules
because no one knows how they will be applied.
http://www.natch.net/stuff/TSA/
There are buildings in the DC area that you can't photograph for
security reasons, but you can't get a list of those buildings -- for
security reasons. Very Kafkaesque.
http://blog.washingtonpost.com/rawfisher/2007/07/secret_buildings_you_may_not_p.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yrzacm
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/buildings_you_c.html
An Enigma machine sold on eBay for $30K:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/enigma_machine.html
U.S. drug enforcement agents use key loggers to bypass both PGP and
Hushmail encryption. I've been saying this for a while: the easiest way
to get at someone's communications is not by intercepting it in transit,
but by accessing it on the sender's or recipient's computers.
http://www.boingboing.net/2007/07/13/dea_agents_used_keyl.html
I've written about forged credentials before, and how hard a problem it
is to solve. Here's another story illustrating the problem: an aide to
ex-governor Mitt Romney created a phony law-enforcement badge.
http://news.bostonherald.com/politics/view.bg?articleid=1012402
Here's the problem: When faced with a badge, most people assume it's
legitimate. And even if they wanted to verify the badge, there's no
real way for them to do so.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/01/forged_credenti.html
Computer security people have been talking about ransomware for years,
but only recently are we seeing it in the wild: software that encrypts
your data, and then charges you for the decryption key.
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070718-new-trojans-give-us-300-or-the-data-gets-it.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yuc3yb
In 2006, there were 20,000 false alarms from the terrorist watch list.
How do I know they were all false alarms? Because this administration
makes a press splash with every arrest, no matter how scant the evidence
is. Do you really think they would pass up a chance to tout how good
the watch list is?
http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/07/watchlists
Definitely read this. It's by Dave Mackett, the president of the Airline
Pilots Security Alliance, talking about airplane security and terrorism.
http://hotair.com/archives/2007/07/16/a-pilot-on-airline-security/
A really interesting essay on truth and photographs.
http://morris.blogs.nytimes.com/
Long and interesting article on fMRI lie detectors, including a
discussion about why we're so bad at detecting lies:
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2007/07/02/070702fa_fact_talbot
Intel security music video, directed by Christopher Guest. Hardware vs.
software security: I can't believe the actors kept a straight face while
filming this.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=12Icxthmpis
Geek Squad computer repair technicians were accused to copying customer
files. We all know it's possible, but we assume that technicians don't
do it. In this case, they were just ogling photos and the like, but how
much are these people paid and how much can they make with a few good
identity thefts?
http://blog.wired.com/gadgets/2007/04/more_like_peep_.html
Poodle identity theft: fake pedigrees.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/wales/north_east/6914119.stm
Security analysis of a 13th century Venetian election protocol.
http://www.hpl.hp.com/techreports/2007/HPL-2007-28R1.html
Venice was very clever about working to avoid the factionalism that tore
apart a lot of its Italian rivals, while making the various factions
feel represented.
Blog entry:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/security_analys_1.html
See-through backpacks required at school. It's a security measure, you see.
http://www.philly.com/philly/education/8655757.html
If you don't like that, how about bulletproof backpacks for children?
http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/13860078/detail.html
That goes with the bulletproof textbooks:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/11/bulletproof_tex.html
Funny article listing some movie-plot-threat presidential debate questions:
http://www.slate.com/id/2169275
Transporting a $1.9M rare coin is a perfect opportunity for effective
security by obscurity.
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/transporting_a.html
A year ago, I wrote about a bank hack at the center of a French national
scandal. Well, the case has taken an interesting turn. Law enforcement
experts managed to retrieve incriminating evidence from the hard disk of
senior intelligence General Rondot after about a year of work. Wouldn't
we all like to know the technical details of both the data shredding and
forensic technologies?
http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9483764
http://www.theage.com.au/news/world/laptop-disc-links-chirac-to-smear-plot/2007/07/06/1183351458767.html
or http://tinyurl.com/ypzj9e
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/07/paris_bank_hack.html
Movie-plot threats in Second Life. This idiotic story has taken on a
life of its own: terrorists training in virtual worlds like Second Life.
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,22163811-2,00.html
http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/07/30/are-terrorists-using-second-life-to-plan-attacks/
or http://tinyurl.com/2debcz
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,22161037-28737,00.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2goym5
Do we all need to take our shoes off before logging in now?
Earlier this month, I wrote about a library of people's smells kept by
the former East German police. Seems that the current German police is
still doing it.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,484561,00.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/a_library_of_pe_1.html
A recent article talked about a security hole at the Phoenix Airport: an
hours-long window when any airport employee can bring anything into the
airport, without any screening at all. I'm not impressed. On the one
hand, it's a big security hole that not everyone knew was there. On the
other hand, airport employees are allowed to bring stuff in and out of
airports without screening all the time. So yes, the airports aren't
secure -- but they never have been, so what's the big deal? The real
issue here is that people don't understand that an airport is a complex
system and that securing it means more than passenger screening.
http://www.abc15.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=568d6b4d-67b7-4116-9098-4c35d8b5ce38#top
or http://tinyurl.com/2zr47x
For a few months, German police tested a face recognition system. Two
hundred frequent travelers volunteered to have their faces recorded and
three different systems tried to recognize the faces in the crowds of a
train station. Results: 60% recognition at best, 30% on average
(depending on light and other factors). I'm not impressed.
http://www.n24.de/politik/article.php?articleId=133703
How do you get a password out of an IRS agent? Just ask:
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20108530/
Another biometric: vein patterns.
http://www.heise-security.co.uk/articles/93233
I don't know about the details of the technology, but the discussions of
false positives, false negatives, and forgeability are the right ones to
have. Remember, though, that while biometrics are an effective security
technology, they're not a panacea.
http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-9808.html#biometrics
Gun-shaped laptop battery:
http://www.forta.com/blog/index.cfm/2007/7/18/How-Not-To-Shape-A-Laptop-Battery
or http://tinyurl.com/2wxww4
Steven D. Levitt, a blogger for The New York Times, is having a
movie-plot threat contest. Far more interesting than the suggested
attacks are the commenters who accuse him of helping the terrorists.
Not that I'm surprised; there were people who accused me of helping the
terrorists.
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/08/if-you-were-a-terrorist-how-would-you-attack/
or http://tinyurl.com/26rp64
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/09/terrorism-part-ii/
My contests:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/announcing_movi.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/04/announcing_seco.html
While it's one thing for this kind of thing to happen in my blog, it's
another for it to happen in a mainstream blog on The New York Times website.
Two weeks ago Congress gave President Bush new wiretapping powers. I
was going to write an essay on the security implications of this, but
Susan Landau beat me to it. This op-ed is a must-read.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/08/AR2007080801961.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2cz43v
And here's more about the Greek wiretapping scandal:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/07/story_of_the_gr_1.html
And I would be remiss if I didn't mention the excellent book by
Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau on the subject: "Privacy on the Line:
The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption."
http://www.amazon.com/Privacy-Line-Politics-Wiretapping-Encryption/dp/0262041677
or http://tinyurl.com/yq8rj5
It's nice to find an example of the police using data mining correctly:
not as security theater, but more as a business-intelligence tool.
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/tech/data-mining.html
Security Problem Excuse Bingo. Very funny:
http://www.crypto.com/bingo/pr
http://www.crypto.com/blog/bingo/
This is a good article about the use of paid informants in Muslim
communities, and how they are both creating potential terrorists where
none existed before and sowing mistrust among people.
http://www.infocusnews.net/content/view/15942/135/
Fascinating "New Scientist" article on conspiracy theories and why we
believe them. Lots of good stuff in the article, including instructions
on how to create your own conspiracy theory.
http://www.newscientist.com/channel/being-human/mg19526121.300-the-lure-of-the-conspiracy-theory.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yrzald
http://www.therazor.org/?p=855
Two interesting phishing studies:
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070723-phishing-for-clicks-in-social-cliques-shockingly-easy.html
or http://tinyurl.com/2zjezj
http://www.webwereld.nl/articles/47539/phishing-researcher--targets--the-unsuspecting.html
or http://tinyurl.com/ywmcf4
Interesting article on security-aware consumer items. I especially
liked the chair design with a place to hang a purse. Seems like a
better idea than the "Chelsea clip."
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/6940485.stm
http://www.selectamark.co.uk/product_chelseaclip.html
Nice article on security theater:
http://www.govexec.com/features/0807-01/0807-01s3.htm
How to escape from plastic police handcuffs:
http://www.metacafe.com/watch/545672/unlock_plastic_handcuffs_police_style/
or http://tinyurl.com/22efj6
How to make a taser out of a cheap camera:
http://www.techeblog.com/index.php/tech-gadget/diy-disposable-camera-taser
or http://tinyurl.com/ydsq2u
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Avian Flu and Disaster Planning
If an avian flu pandemic broke out tomorrow, would your company be ready
for it?
"Computerworld" published a series of articles on that question last
year, prompted by a presentation analyst firm Gartner gave at a
conference last November. Among Gartner's recommendations: "Store 42
gallons of water per data center employee -- enough for a six-week
quarantine -- and don't forget about food, medical care, cooking
facilities, sanitation and electricity."
And Gartner's conclusion, over half a year later: Pretty much no
organizations are ready.
This doesn't surprise me at all. It's not that organizations don't spend
enough effort on disaster planning, although that's true; it's that this
really isn't the sort of disaster worth planning for.
Disaster planning is critically important for individuals, families,
organizations large and small, and governments. For the individual, it
can be as simple as spending a few minutes thinking about how he or she
would respond to a disaster. For example, I've spent a lot of time
thinking about what I would do if I lost the use of my computer, whether
by equipment failure, theft or government seizure. As a result, I have a
pretty complex backup and encryption system, ensuring that 1) I'd still
have access to my data, and 2) no one else would. On the other hand, I
haven't given any serious thought to family disaster planning, although
others have.
For an organization, disaster planning can be much more complex. What
would it do in the case of fire, flood, earthquake, and so on? How would
its business survive? The resultant disaster plan might include backup
data centers, temporary staffing contracts, planned degradation of
services, and a host of other products and service -- and consultants to
tell you how to use it all.
And anyone who does this kind of thing knows that planning isn't enough:
Testing your disaster plan is critical. Far too often the backup
software fails when it has to do an actual restore, or the
diesel-powered emergency generator fails to kick in. That's also the
flaw with emergency kit links given below; if you don't know how to use
a compass or first-aid kit, having one in your car won't do you much good.
But testing isn't just valuable because it reveals practical problems
with a plan. It also has enormous ancillary benefits for your
organization in terms of communication and team building. There's
nothing like a good crisis to get people to rely on each other.
Sometimes I think companies should forget about those team-building
exercises that involve climbing trees and building fires, and instead
pretend that a flood has taken out the primary data center.
It really doesn't matter what disaster scenario you're testing. The real
disaster won't be like the test, regardless of what you do, so just pick
one and go. Whether you're an individual trying to recover from a
simulated virus attack, or an organization testing its response to a
hypothetical shooter in the building, you'll learn a lot about
yourselves and your organization, as well as your plan.
There is a sweet spot, though, in disaster preparedness. Some disasters
are too small or too common to worry about. ("We're out of paper clips!?
Call the Crisis Response Team together. I'll get the Paper Clip Shortage
Readiness Program Directive Manual Plan.") And others are too large or
too rare.
It makes no sense to plan for total annihilation of the continent,
whether by nuclear or meteor strike: that's obvious. But depending on
the size of the planner, many other disasters are also too large to plan
for. People can stockpile food and water to prepare for a hurricane that
knocks out services for a few days, but not for a Katrina-like flood
that knocks out services for months. Organizations can prepare for
losing a data center due to a flood, fire, or hurricane, but not for a
Black-Death-scale epidemic that would wipe out a third of the
population. No one can fault bond trading firm Cantor Fitzgerald, which
lost two thirds of its employees in the 9/11 attack on the World Trade
Center, for not having a plan in place to deal with that possibility.
Another consideration is scope. If your corporate headquarters burns
down, it's actually a bigger problem for you than a citywide disaster
that does much more damage. If the whole San Francisco Bay Area were
taken out by an earthquake, customers of affected companies would be far
more likely to forgive lapses in service, or would go the extra mile to
help out. Think of the nationwide response to 9/11; the human "just deal
with it" social structures kicked in, and we all muddled through.
In general, you can only reasonably prepare for disasters that leave
your world largely intact. If a third of the country's population dies,
it's a different world. The economy is different, the laws are different
-- the world is different. You simply can't plan for it; there's no way
you can know enough about what the new world will look like. Disaster
planning only makes sense within the context of existing society.
What all of this means is that any bird flu pandemic will very likely
fall outside the corporate disaster-planning sweet spot. We're just
guessing on its infectiousness, of course, but (despite the alarmism
from two and three years ago), likely scenarios are either moderate to
severe absenteeism because people are staying home for a few weeks --
any organization ought to be able to deal with that -- or a major
disaster of proportions that dwarf the concerns of any organization.
There's not much in between.
Honestly, if you think you're heading toward a world where you need to
stash six weeks' worth of food and water in your company's closets, do
you really believe that it will be enough to see you through to the
other side?
A blogger commented on what I said in one article: "Schneier is using
what I would call the nuclear war argument for doing nothing. If there's
a nuclear war nothing will be left anyway, so why waste your time
stockpiling food or building fallout shelters? It's entirely out of your
control. It's someone else's responsibility. Don't worry about it."
Almost. Bird flu, pandemics, and disasters in general -- whether
man-made like 9/11, natural like bird flu, or a combination like Katrina
-- are definitely things we should worry about. The proper place for
bird flu planning is at the government level. (These are also the people
who should worry about nuclear and meteor strikes.) But real disasters
don't exactly match our plans, and we are best served by a bunch of
generic disaster plans and a smart, flexible organization that can deal
with anything.
The key is preparedness. Much more important than planning, preparedness
is about setting up social structures so that people fall into doing
something sensible when things go wrong. Think of all the wasted effort
-- and even more wasted *desire* -- to do something after Katrina
because there was no way for most people to help. Preparedness is about
getting people to react when there's a crisis. It's something the
military trains its soldiers for.
This advice holds true for organizations, families, and individuals as
well. And remember, despite what you read about nuclear accidents,
suicide terrorism, genetically engineered viruses, and mutant man-eating
badgers, you live in the safest society in the history of mankind.
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=security&articleId=275619
or http://tinyurl.com/ymlmz4
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=9026179
or http://tinyurl.com/2crd9n
http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleId=298413&pageNumber=1
or http://tinyurl.com/2xtgdq
http://www.computerworld.com/blogs/node/5854
Family disaster planning:
http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/005763.html
http://nielsenhayden.com/makinglight/archives/006539.html
http://www.sff.net/people/doylemacdonald/emerg_kit.htm
Disaster Recovery Journal:
http://www.drj.com/
Bird flu:
http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/
http://infectiousdiseases.about.com/od/faqs/f/whynot1918.htm
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6861065/
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/4295649.stm
http://www.cnn.com/2004/HEALTH/11/25/birdflu.warning/index.html
Blogger comments:
http://www.computerworld.com/blogs/node/5854
Man-eating badgers:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/6295138.stm
A good rebuttal to this essay:
http://www.computerweekly.com/blogs/david_lacey/2007/07/no-disaster-is-too-large-to-pl.html
or http://tinyurl.com/288ybo
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com:
http://www.wired.com/print/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/07/securitymatters_0726
or http://tinyurl.com/2mb8bg
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
TSA Warns of Terrorist Dry Runs
A leaked TSA memo warns screeners to be on the lookout for terrorists
staging dry runs through airport security. (The TSA issued a short
statement following the leak.)
Honestly, the four incidents described, with photos, sure sound
suspicious to me:
"San Diego, July 7. A U.S. person -- either a citizen or a foreigner
legally here -- checked baggage containing two ice packs covered in duct
tape. The ice packs had clay inside them rather than the normal blue gel.
"Milwaukee, June 4. A U.S. person's carryon baggage contained wire coil
wrapped around a possible initiator, an electrical switch, batteries,
three tubes and two blocks of cheese. The bulletin said block cheese has
a consistency similar to some explosives.
"Houston, Nov. 8, 2006. A U.S. person's checked baggage contained a
plastic bag with a 9-volt battery, wires, a block of brown clay-like
minerals and pipes.
"Baltimore, Sept. 16, 2006. A couple's checked baggage contained a
plastic bag with a block of processed cheese taped to another plastic
bag holding a cellular phone charger.
The cheese and clay are stand-ins for plastic explosive. And honestly,
I don't care if someone is carrying a water bottle, wearing a head
scarf, or buying a one-way ticket, but if someone has a block of cheese
with wires and a detonator -- I want the FBI to be called in.
Note that profiling didn't seem to help here. Three of the incidents
involved U.S. persons, and one is unspecified. Also, according to the
report: "Individuals involved in these incidents were of varying
gender, and initial investigations do not link them with criminal or
terrorist organizations. However, most passengers' explanations for
carrying the suspicious items were questionable, and some investigations
are still ongoing."
I wish I had more information on what the "questionable" explanations
were; either these people are innocent or they should be investigated
pretty heavily. Later news reports said that the San Diego incident was
bogus, and maybe all four were.
I'm skeptical. I can't think of a valid explanation for "wire coil
wrapped around a possible initiator, an electrical switch, batteries,
three tubes and two blocks of cheese." I'd like to know what it was.
Flagging suspicious items is what the TSA is supposed to do.
Unfortunately, "suspicious" is a subjective term, and problems arise
when screeners aren't competent enough to distinguish between
"potentially dangerous" and "just plain strange." If bulletins like
these are accompanied with real training, then we're getting some actual
security out of the TSA.
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/NEWS/pdfs/airport%20warning.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/yqzqlu
http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/intelligence_bulletin.shtm
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-07-25-tsa_N.htm
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20070725-1207-bn25false.html
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/TSA_dry_run_terror_alerts_bogus_0727.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Security-Theater Cameras Coming to New York
In this otherwise lopsided article about security cameras, this one
quote stands out:
"But Steve Swain, who served for years with the London Metropolitan
Police and its counter-terror operations, doubts the power of cameras to
deter crime.
"'I don't know of a single incident where CCTV has actually been used to
spot, apprehend or detain offenders in the act,' he said, referring to
the London system. Swain now works for Control Risk, an international
security firm.
"Asked about their role in possibly stopping acts of terror, he said
pointedly: 'The presence of CCTV is irrelevant for those who want to
sacrifice their lives to carry out a terrorist act.' "
And:
"Swain does believe the cameras have great value in investigation work.
He also said they are necessary to reassure the public that law
enforcement is being aggressive.
"'You need to do this piece of theater so that if the terrorists are
looking at you, they can see that you've got some measures in place,' he
said. "
Did you get that? Swain doesn't believe that cameras deter crime, but
he wants cities to spend millions on them so that the terrorists "can
see that you've got some measures in place."
Anyone have any idea why we're better off doing this than other things
that may actually deter crime and terrorism?
http://www.cnn.com/2007/TECH/08/01/nyc.surveillance/index.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Schneier/BT Counterpane News
Schneier was interviewed for The Command Line podcast:
http://thecommandline.net/2007/08/01/bruce_schneier/
"BT Counterpane Securing your Network" video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IwiPH_s0x3M
"Schneier on Security" video:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IoXoHlI86rQ
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Airport Security Breach
One of the problems with airport security checkpoints is that the system
is a single point of failure. If someone slips through, the only way to
regain security is for the entire airport to be emptied and everyone
searched again. This happens rarely, but when it does, it can close an
airport for hours.
It happened last week at the Charlotte airport.
One sentence in the news report struck me: "Passengers on another 15
planes that took off after the breach will have to go through screening
again when they reach their destinations, the TSA said."
It's understandable why the TSA would want to screen everybody once
someone evades security: that person could give his contraband to
someone else. And since the entire airport system is a single secure
area -- once you go through security at one airport, you are considered
to be inside security at all airports -- it makes sense for those
passengers to be screened if they're changing planes.
But it must feel weird to have to go through screening after flying,
before being able to leave the airport.
http://edition.cnn.com/2007/US/08/10/charlotte.airport/
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Details on the UK Liquid Terrorist Plot
U.S. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff is releasing details
about last summer's liquid-bomb plot:
"The components of that explosives mixture can be bought at any
drugstore or supermarket; however, there is some question whether the
potential terrorists would have had the skill to properly mix and
detonate their explosive cocktails in-flight.
"But they can work -- scientists at Sandia National Laboratory conducted
a test using the formula, and when a small amount of liquid in a
container was hit with a tiny burst of electrical current, a large
explosion followed. (Click on the video player on the right side of this
page to view the video.)
"The test results were reviewed today by ABC terrorism consultant
Richard Clarke, who said that while frequent travelers are upset by the
current limits on liquids in carry-on baggage, 'when they see this film,
they ought to know it's worth going through those problems.'"
There has been a lot of speculation since last year about the
plausibility of the plot, with most chemists falling on the
"unrealistic" side.
I'm still skeptical, especially because the liquid ban doesn't actually
ban liquids. If they're so dangerous, why can anyone take 12 ounces of
any liquid on any plane at any time? That's the real question, which
TSA Administrator Kip Hawley deftly didn't answer in my conversation
with him -- see below. (I brought it on a plane again yesterday: an
opaque 12-ounce bottle labeled "saline," emptied and filled with another
liquid, and then resealed. I held it up to the TSA official and made
sure it was okay. It was.)
Another quote from the same article:
"One official who briefed ABC News said explosives and security experts
who examined the plot were 'stunned at the extent that the suspects had
gamed the system to exploit its weaknesses.'
"'There's no question that they had given a lot of thought to how they
might smuggle containers with liquid explosives onto airplanes,'
Chertoff said. 'Without getting into things that are still classified,
they obviously paid attention to the ways in which they thought they
might be able to disguise these explosives as very innocent types of
everyday articles.'"
Well, yeah. That's the game you're stuck playing. From my conversation
with Hawley (that's me talking):
"But you're playing a game you can't win. You ban guns and bombs, so the
terrorists use box cutters. You ban small blades and knitting needles,
and they hide explosives in their shoes. You screen shoes, so they
invent a liquid explosive. You restrict liquids, and they're going to do
something else. The terrorists are going to look at what you're
confiscating, and they're going to design a plot to bypass your security."
Stop focusing on the tactics; focus on the broad threats.
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/story?id=3451976&page=1
Previous speculation:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/on_the_implausi.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
House of Lords on Computer Security
The Science and Technology Committee of the UK House of Lords has issued
a report on "Personal Internet Security." It's 121 pages long. Richard
Clayton, who helped the committee, has a good summary of the report on
his blog. Among other things, the Lords recommend various consumer
notification standards, a data-breach disclosure law, and a liability
regime for software.
The Register writes that the report recommends the UK government:
"Increase the resources and skills available to the police and criminal
justice system to catch and prosecute e-criminals.
"Establish a centralised and automated system, administered by law
enforcement, for the reporting of e-crime.
"Provide incentives to banks and other companies trading online to
improve the data security by establishing a data security breach
notification law.
"Improve standards of new software and hardware by moving towards legal
liability for damage resulting from security flaws.
"Encourage Internet Service Providers to improve customer security
offered by establishing a "kite mark" for internet services."
If that sounds like a lot of the things I've been saying for years,
there's a reason for that. Earlier this year, I testified before the
committee, where I recommended some of these things. (Sadly, I didn't
get to wear a powdered wig.)
Report:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/16502.htm
or http://tinyurl.com/33szpp
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165i.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/27ca43
Summaries:
http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2007/08/10/house-of-lords-inquiry-personal-internet-security/
or http://tinyurl.com/3xloj3
http://www.theregister.com/2007/08/10/lords_net_security_report/
Transcript of my testimony:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld/lduncorr/s&tii210207a.pdf
The entire body of evidence:
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/16502.htm#evidence
or http://tinyurl.com/23dgaa
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldselect/ldsctech/165/165ii.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/22hae9
I don't recommend reading it; it's absolutely huge, and a lot of it is
corporate drivel.
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Conversation with Kip Hawley
In April, Kip Hawley, the head of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), invited me to Washington for a meeting. Despite
some serious trepidation, I accepted. And it was a good meeting. Most
of it was off the record, but he asked me how the TSA could overcome its
negative image. I told him to be more transparent, and stop ducking the
hard questions. He said that he wanted to do that. He did enjoy
writing a guest blog post for "Aviation Daily," but having a blog
himself didn't work within the bureaucracy. What else could he do?
This interview, conducted in May and June via e-mail, was one of my
suggestions.
Bruce Schneier: By today's rules, I can carry on liquids in quantities
of three ounces or less, unless they're in larger bottles. But I can
carry on multiple three-ounce bottles. Or a single larger bottle with a
non-prescription medicine label, like contact lens fluid. It all has to
fit inside a one-quart plastic bag, except for that large bottle of
contact lens fluid. And if you confiscate my liquids, you're going to
toss them into a large pile right next to the screening station -- which
you would never do if anyone thought they were actually dangerous.
Can you please convince me there's not an Office for Annoying Air
Travelers making this sort of stuff up?
Kip Hawley: Screening ideas are indeed thought up by the Office for
Annoying Air Travelers and vetted through the Directorate for Confusion
and Complexity, and then we review them to insure that there are
sufficient unintended irritating consequences so that the blogosphere is
constantly fueled. Imagine for a moment that TSA people are somewhat
bright, and motivated to protect the public with the least intrusion
into their lives, not to mention travel themselves. How might you
engineer backwards from that premise to get to three ounces and a baggie?
We faced a different kind of liquid explosive, one that was engineered
to evade then-existing technology and process. Not the old Bojinka
formula or other well-understood ones -- TSA already trains and tests on
those. After August 10, we began testing different variants with the
national labs, among others, and engaged with other countries that have
sophisticated explosives capabilities to find out what is necessary to
reliably bring down a plane.
We started with the premise that we should prohibit only what's needed
from a security perspective. Otherwise, we would have stuck with a total
liquid ban. But we learned through testing that that no matter what
someone brought on, if it was in a small enough container, it wasn't a
serious threat. So what would the justification be for prohibiting lip
gloss, nasal spray, etc? There was none, other than for our own
convenience and the sake of a simple explanation.
Based on the scientific findings and a
don't-intrude-unless-needed-for-security philosophy, we came up with a
container size that eliminates an assembled bomb (without having to
determine what exactly is inside the bottle labeled "shampoo"), limits
the total liquid any one person can bring (without requiring
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) to count individual bottles),
and allows for additional security measures relating to multiple people
mixing a bomb post-checkpoint. Three ounces and a baggie in the bin
gives us a way for people to safely bring on limited quantities of
liquids, aerosols and gels.
BS: How will this foil a plot, given that there are no consequences to
trying? Airplane contraband falls into two broad categories: stuff you
get in trouble for trying to smuggle onboard, and stuff that just gets
taken away from you. If I'm caught at a security checkpoint with a gun
or a bomb, you're going to call the police and really ruin my day. But
if I have a large bottle of that liquid explosive, you confiscate it
with a smile and let me though. So unless you're 100% perfect in
catching this stuff -- which you're not -- I can just try again and
again until I get it through.
This isn't like contaminants in food, where if you remove 90% of the
particles, you're 90% safer. None of those false alarms -- none of
those innocuous liquids taken away from innocent travelers -- improve
security. We're only safer if you catch the one explosive liquid
amongst the millions of containers of water, shampoo, and toothpaste. I
have described two ways to get large amounts of liquids onto airplanes
-- large bottles labeled "saline solution" and trying until the
screeners miss the liquid -- not to mention combining multiple little
bottles of liquid into one big bottle after the security checkpoint.
I want to assume the TSA is both intelligent and motivated to protect
us. I'm taking your word for it that there is an actual threat -- lots
of chemists disagree -- but your liquid ban isn't mitigating it.
Instead, I have the sinking feeling that you're defending us against a
terrorist smart enough to develop his own liquid explosive, yet too
stupid to read the rules on TSA's own website.
KH: I think your premise is wrong. There are consequences to coming to
an airport with a bomb and having some of the materials taken away at
the checkpoint. Putting aside our layers of security for the moment,
there are things you can do to get a TSO's attention at the checkpoint.
If a TSO finds you or the contents of your bag suspicious, you might
get interviewed and/or have your bags more closely examined. If the TSO
throws your liquids in the trash, they don't find you a threat.
I often read blog posts about how someone could just take all their
three-ounce bottles -- or take bottles from others on the plane -- and
combine them into a larger container to make a bomb. I can't get into
the specifics, but our explosives research shows this is not a viable
option.
The current system is not the best we'll ever come up with. In the near
future, we'll come up with an automated system to take care of liquids,
and everyone will be happier.
In the meantime, we have begun using hand-held devices that can
recognize threat liquids through factory-sealed containers (we will
increase their number through the rest of the year) and we have
different test strips that are effective when a bottle is opened. Right
now, we're using them on exempt items like medicines, as well as
undeclared liquids TSOs find in bags. This will help close the
vulnerability and strengthen the deterrent.
BS: People regularly point to security checkpoints missing a knife in
their handbag as evidence that security screening isn't working. But
that's wrong. Complete effectiveness is not the goal; the checkpoints
just have to be effective enough so that the terrorists are worried
their plan will be uncovered. But in Denver earlier this year, testers
sneaked 90% of weapons through. And other tests aren't much better.
Why are these numbers so poor, and why didn't they get better when the
TSA took over airport security?
KH: Your first point is dead on and is the key to how we look at
security. The stories about 90% failures are wrong or extremely
misleading. We do many kinds of effectiveness tests at checkpoints
daily. We use them to guide training and decisions on technology and
operating procedures. We also do extensive and very sophisticated Red
Team testing, and one of their jobs is to observe checkpoints and go
back and figure out -- based on inside knowledge of what we do -- ways
to beat the system. They isolate one particular thing: for example, a
particular explosive, made and placed in a way that exploits a
particular weakness in technology; our procedures; or the way TSOs do
things in practice. Then they will test that particular thing over and
over until they identify what corrective action is needed. We then
change technology or procedure, or plain old focus on execution. And we
repeat the process -- forever.
So without getting into specifics on the test results, of course there
are times that our evaluations can generate high failure rate numbers on
specific scenarios. Overall, though, our ability to detect bomb
components is vastly improved and it will keep getting better. (Older
scores you may have seen may be "feel good" numbers based on old, easy
tests. Don't go for the sound-bite; today's TSOs are light-years ahead
of even where they were two years ago.)
BS: I hope you're telling the truth; screening is a difficult problem,
and it's hard to discount all of those published tests and reports. But
a lot of the security around these checkpoints is about perception -- we
want potential terrorists to think there's a significant chance they
won't get through the checkpoints -- so you're better off maintaining
that the screeners are better than reports indicate, even if they're not.
Backscatter X-ray is another technology that is causing privacy
concerns, since it basically allows you to see people naked. Can you
explain the benefits of the technology, and what you are doing to
protect privacy? Although the machines can distort the images, we know
that they can store raw, unfiltered images; the manufacturer Rapiscan is
quite proud of the fact. Are the machines you're using routinely
storing images? Can they store images at the screener's discretion, or
is that capability turned off at installation?
KH: We're still evaluating backscatter and are in the process of running
millimeter wave portals right alongside backscatter to compare their
effectiveness and the privacy issues. We do not now store images for the
test phase (function disabled), and although we haven't officially
resolved the issue, I fully understand the privacy argument and don't
assume that we will store them if and when they're widely deployed.
BS: When can we keep our shoes on?
KH: Any time after you clear security. Sorry, Bruce, I don't like it
either, but this is not just something leftover from 2002. It is a real,
current concern. We're looking at shoe scanners and ways of using
millimeter wave and/or backscatter to get there, but until the
technology catches up to the risk, the shoes have to go in the bin.
BS: This feels so much like "cover your ass" security: you're screening
our shoes because everyone knows Richard Reid hid explosives in them,
and you'll be raked over the coals if that particular plot ever happens
again. But there are literally thousands of possible plots.
So when does it end? The terrorists invented a particular tactic, and
you're defending against it. But you're playing a game you can't win.
You ban guns and bombs, so the terrorists use box cutters. You ban
small blades and knitting needles, and they hide explosives in their
shoes. You screen shoes, so they invent a liquid explosive. You
restrict liquids, and they're going to do something else. The
terrorists are going to look at what you're confiscating, and they're
going to design a plot to bypass your security.
That's the real lesson of the liquid bombers. Assuming you're right and
the explosive was real, it was an explosive that none of the security
measures at the time would have detected. So why play this slow game of
whittling down what people can bring onto airplanes? When do you say:
"Enough. It's not about the details of the tactic; it's about the broad
threat"?
KH: In late 2005, I made a big deal about focusing on Improvised
Explosives Devices (IEDs) and not chasing all the things that could be
used as weapons. Until the liquids plot this summer, we were defending
our decision to let scissors and small tools back on planes and trying
to add layers like behavior detection and document checking, so it is
ironic that you ask this question--I am in vehement agreement with your
premise. We'd rather focus on things that can do catastrophic harm
(bombs!) and add layers to get people with hostile intent to highlight
themselves. We have a responsibility, though, to address known continued
active attack methods like shoes and liquids and, unfortunately, have to
use our somewhat clunky process for now.
BS: You don't have a responsibility to screen shoes; you have one to
protect air travel from terrorism to the best of your ability. You're
picking and choosing. We know the Chechnyan terrorists who downed two
Russian planes in 2004 got through security partly because different
people carried the explosive and the detonator. Why doesn't this count
as a continued, active attack method?
I don't want to even think about how much C4 I can strap to my legs and
walk through your magnetometers. Or search the Internet for
"BeerBelly." It's a device you can strap to your chest to smuggle beer
into stadiums, but you can also use it smuggle 40 ounces of dangerous
liquid explosive onto planes. The magnetometer won't detect it. Your
secondary screening wandings won't detect it. Why aren't you making us
all take our shirts off? Will you have to find a printout of the
webpage in some terrorist safe house? Or will someone actually have to
try it? If that doesn't bother you, search the Internet for "cell phone
gun."
It's "cover your ass" security. If someone tries to blow up a plane
with a shoe or a liquid, you'll take a lot of blame for not catching it.
But if someone uses any of these other, equally known, attack methods,
you'll be blamed less because they're less public.
KH: Dead wrong! Our security strategy assumes an adaptive terrorist, and
that looking backwards is not a reliable predictor of the next type of
attack. Yes, we screen for shoe bombs and liquids, because it would be
stupid not to directly address attack methods that we believe to be
active. Overall, we are getting away from trying to predict what the
object looks like and looking more for the other markers of a terrorist.
(Don't forget, we see two million people a day, so we know what normal
looks like.) What he/she does; the way they behave. That way we don't
put all our eggs in the basket of catching them in the act. We can't
give them free rein to surveil or do dry-runs; we need to put up
obstacles for them at every turn. Working backwards, what do you need to
do to be successful in an attack? Find the decision points that show the
difference between normal action and action needed for an attack. Our
odds are better with this approach than by trying to take away methods,
annoying object by annoying object. Bruce, as for blame, that's nothing
compared to what all of us would carry inside if we failed to prevent an
attack.
BS: Let's talk about ID checks. I've called the no-fly list a list of
people so dangerous they cannot be allowed to fly under any
circumstance, yet so innocent we can't arrest them even under the
Patriot Act. Except that's not even true; anyone, no matter how
dangerous they are, can fly without an ID -- or by using someone else's
boarding pass. And the list itself is filled with people who shouldn't
be on it -- dead people, people in jail, and so on -- and primarily
catches innocents with similar names. Why are you bothering?
KH: Because it works. We just completed a scrub of every name on the
no-fly list and cut it in half -- essentially cleaning out people who
were no longer an active terror threat. We do not publicize how often
the no-fly system stops people you would not want on your flight.
Several times a week would low-ball it.
Your point about the no-ID and false boarding pass people is a great
one. We are moving people who have tools and training to get at that
problem. The bigger issue is that TSA is moving in the direction of
security that picks up on behavior versus just keying on what we see in
your bag. It really would be security theater if all we did was try to
find possible weapons in that crunched fifteen seconds and fifteen feet
after you anonymously walk through the magnetometer. We do a better
job, with less aggravation of ordinary passengers, if we put
people-based layers further ahead in the process -- behavior observation
based on involuntary, observable muscle behavior, canine teams, document
verification, etc.
BS: We'll talk about behavioral profiling later; no fair defending one
security measure by pointing to another, completely separate, one. How
can you claim ID cards work? Like the liquid ban, all it does is annoy
innocent travelers without doing more than inconveniencing any future
terrorists. Is it really good enough for you to defend me from
terrorists too dumb to Google "print your own boarding pass"?
KH: We are getting at the fake boarding pass and ID issues with our
proposal to Congress that would allow us to replace existing document
checkers with more highly trained people with tools that would close
those gaps. Without effective identity verification, watch lists don't
do much, so this is a top priority.
Having highly trained TSOs performing the document checking function
closes a security gap, adds another security layer, and pushes TSA's
security program out in front of the checkpoint.
BS: Let's move on. Air travelers think you're capricious. Remember in
April when the story went around about the Princeton professor being on
a no-fly list because he spoke out against President Bush? His claims
were easily debunked, but the real story is that so many people believed
it. People believe political activity puts them on the list. People
are afraid to complain about being mistreated at checkpoints because
they're afraid it puts them on a list. Is there anything you can do to
make this process more transparent?
KH: We need some help on this one. This is the biggest public pain
point, dwarfing shoes and baggies.
First off, TSA does not add people to the watch-lists, no matter how
cranky you are at a checkpoint. Second, political views have nothing to
do with no-flys or selectees. These myths have taken on urban legend
status. There are very strict criteria and they are reviewed by lots of
separate people in separate agencies: it is for live terror concerns
only. The problem comes from random selectees (literally mathematically
random) or people who have the same name and birth date as real no-flys.
If you can get a boarding pass, you are not on the no-fly list. This
problem will go away when Secure Flight starts in 2008, but we can't
seem to shake the false impression that ordinary Americans get put on a
"list." I am open for suggestions on how to make the public "get it."
BS: It's hard to believe that there could be hundreds of thousands of
people meeting those very strict criteria, and that's after the list was
cut in half! I know the TSA does not control the no-fly and watch
lists, but you're the public face of those lists. You're the aspect of
homeland security that people come into direct contact with. Some
people might find out they're on the list by being arrested, or being
shipped off to Syria for torture, but most people find out they're on
the list by being repeatedly searched and questioned for hours at airports.
The main problem with the list is that it's secret. Who is on the list
is secret. Why someone's on is secret. How someone can get off is
secret. There's no accountability and there's no transparency. Of
course this kind of thing induces paranoia. It's the sort of thing you
read about in history books about East Germany and other police states.
The best thing you can do to improve the problem is redress. People
need the ability to see the evidence against them, challenge their
accuser, and have a hearing in a neutral court. If they're guilty of
something, arrest them. And if they're innocent, stop harassing them.
It's basic liberty.
I don't actually expect you to fix this; the problem is larger than the
TSA. But can you tell us something about redress? It's been promised
to us for years now.
KH: Redress issues are divided into two categories: people on the no-fly
list and people who have names similar to them.
In our experience, the first group is not a heavy user of the redress
process. They typically don't want anything to do with the U.S.
government. Still, if someone is either wrongly put on or kept on, the
Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) removes him or her immediately. In
fact, TSA worked with the TSC to review every name, and that review cut
the no-fly list in half. Having said that, once someone is really on
the no-fly list, I totally agree with what you said about appeal rights.
This is true across the board, not just with no-flys. DHS has recently
consolidated redress for all DHS activities into one process called DHS
TRIP. If you are mistaken for a real no-fly, you can let TSA know and
we provide your information to the airlines, who right now are
responsible for identifying no-flys trying to fly. Each airline uses its
own system, so some can get you cleared to use kiosks, while others
still require a visit to the ticket agent. When Secure Flight is
operating, we'll take that in-house at TSA and the problem should go away.
BS: I still don't see how that will work, as long as the TSA doesn't
have control over who gets on or off the list.
What about Registered Traveler? When TSA first started talking about
the program, the plan was to divide people into two categories: more
trusted people who get less screening, and less trusted people who get
more screening. This opened an enormous security hole; whenever you
create an easy way and a hard way through security, you invite the bad
guys to take the easier way. Since then, it's transformed into a way
for people to pay for better screening equipment and faster
processing--a great idea with no security downsides. Given that, why
bother with the background checks at all? What else is it besides a way
for a potential terrorist to spend $60 and find out if the government is
on to them?
KH: Registered Traveler (RT) is a promising program but suffers from
unrealistic expectations. The idea -- that you and I aren't really risks
and we should be screened less so that TSA can apply scarce resources on
the more likely terrorist -- makes sense and got branded as RT. The
problem is that with two million people a day, how can we tell them
apart in an effective way? We know terrorists use people who are not on
watch lists and who don't have criminal convictions, so we can't use
those criteria alone. Right now, I've said that RT is behind Secure
Flight in priority and that TSA is open to working with private sector
entities to facilitate RT, but we will not fund it, reduce overall
security, or inconvenience regular travelers. As private companies
deploy extra security above what TSA does, we can change the screening
process accordingly. It has to be more than a front-of-the-line pass,
and I think there are some innovations coming out in the year ahead that
will better de
fine what RT can become.
BS: Let's talk about behavioral profiling. I've long thought that most
of airline security could be ditched in favor of well-trained guards,
both in and out of uniform, wandering the crowds looking for suspicious
behavior. Can you talk about some of the things you're doing along
those lines, and especially ways to prevent this from turning into just
another form of racial profiling?
KH: Moving security out from behind the checkpoint is a big priority for
us. First, it gives us the opportunity to pick up a threat a lot
earlier. Taking away weapons or explosives at the checkpoint is stopping
the plot at nearly the last possible moment. Obviously, a good security
system aims at stopping attacks well before that. That's why we have
many layers of security (intel, law enforcement, behavior detection,
etc.) to get to that person well before the security checkpoint. When a
threat gets to the checkpoint, we're operating on his/her terms -- they
pick when, where, and how they present themselves to us. We want to pick
up the cues on our terms, before they're ready, even if they're just at
the surveillance stage.
We use a system of behavior observation that is based on the science
that demonstrates that there are certain involuntary, subconscious
actions that can betray a person's hostile intent. For instance, there
are tiny -- but noticeable to the trained person -- movements in a
person's facial muscles when they have certain emotions. It is very
different from the stress we all show when we're anxious about missing
the flight due to, say, a long security line. This is true across race,
gender, age, ethnicity, etc. It is our way of not falling into the trap
where we predict what a terrorist is going to look like. We know they
use people who "look like" terrorists, but they also use people who do
not, perhaps thinking that we cue only off of what the 9/11 hijackers
looked like.
Our Behavior Detection teams routinely -- and quietly -- identify
problem people just through observable behavior cues. More than 150
people have been identified by our teams, turned over to law
enforcement, and subsequently arrested. This layer is invisible to the
public, but don't discount it, because it may be the most effective. We
publicize non-terrorist-related successes like a murder suspect caught
in Minneapolis and a bank robber caught in Philadelphia.
Most common are people showing phony documents, but we have even picked
out undercover operatives--including our own. One individual,
identified by a TSO in late May and not allowed to fly, was killed in a
police shoot-out five days later. Additionally, several individuals
have been of interest from the counter-terrorism perspective. With just
this limited deployment of Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), we have
identified more people of counterterrorism interest than all the people
combined caught with prohibited items. Look for us to continue to look
at ways that highlight problem people rather than just problem objects.
BS: That's really good news, and I think it's the most promising new
security measure you've got. Although, honestly, bragging about
capturing a guy for wearing a fake military uniform just makes you look
silly.
So far, we've only talked about passengers. What about airport workers?
Nearly one million workers move in and out of airports every day
without ever being screened. The JFK plot, as laughably unrealistic as
it was, highlighted the security risks of airport workers. As with any
security problem, we need to secure the weak links, rather than make
already strong links stronger. What about airport employees, delivery
vehicles, and so on?
KH: I totally agree with your point about a strong base level of
security everywhere and not creating large gaps by over-focusing on one
area. This is especially true with airport employees. We do background
checks on all airport employees who have access to the sterile area.
These employees are in the same places doing the same jobs day after
day, so when someone does something out of the ordinary, it immediately
stands out. They serve as an additional set of eyes and ears throughout
the airport.
Even so, we should do more on airport employees and my House testimony
of April 19 gives details of where we're heading. The main point is
that everything you need for an attack is already inside the perimeter
of an airport. For example, why take lighters from people who work with
blowtorches in facilities with millions of gallons of jet fuel?
You could perhaps feel better by setting up employee checkpoints at
entry points, but you'd hassle a lot of people at great cost with
minimal additional benefit, and a smart, patient terrorist could find a
way to beat you. Today's random, unpredictable screenings that can and
do occur everywhere, all the time (including delivery vehicles, etc.)
are harder to defeat. With the latter, you make it impossible to
engineer an attack; with the former, you give the blueprint for exactly
that.
BS: There's another reason to screen pilots and flight attendants: they
go through the same security lines as passengers. People have to
remember that it's not pilots being screened, it's people dressed as
pilots. You either have to implement a system to verify that people
dressed as pilots are actual pilots, or just screen everybody. The
latter choice is far easier.
I want to ask you about general philosophy. Basically, there are three
broad ways of defending airplanes: preventing bad people from getting on
them (ID checks), preventing bad objects from getting on them (passenger
screening, baggage screening), and preventing bad things from happening
on them (reinforcing the cockpit door, sky marshals). The first one
seems to be a complete failure, the second one is spotty at best. I've
always been a fan of the third. Any future developments in that area?
KH: You are too eager to discount the first--stopping bad people from
getting on planes. That is the most effective! Don't forget about all
the intel work done partnering with other countries to stop plots before
they get here (UK liquids, NY subway), all the work done to keep them
out either through no-flys (at least several times a month) or by
Customs & Border Protection on their way in, and law enforcement once
they are here (Ft. Dix). Then, you add the behavior observation (both
uniformed and not) and identity validation (as we take that on) and
that's all before they get to the checkpoint.
The screening-for-things part, we've discussed, so I'll jump to in-air
measures. Reinforced, locked cockpit doors and air marshals are indeed
huge upgrades since 9/11. Along the same lines, you have to consider the
role of the engaged flight crew and passengers -- they are quick to give
a heads-up about suspicious behavior and they can, and do, take decisive
action when threatened. Also, there are thousands of flights covered by
pilots who are qualified as law enforcement and are armed, as well as
the agents from other government entities like the Secret Service and
FBI who provide coverage as well. There is also a fair amount of
communications with the flight deck during flights if anything comes up
en route--either in the aircraft or if we get information that would be
of interest to them. That allows "quiet" diversions or other preventive
measures. Training is, of course, important too. Pilots need to know
what to do in the event of a missile sighting or other event, and need
to know what we are going to do in different situations. Other things
coming: better air-to-ground communications for air marshals and flight
information, including, possibly, video.
So, when you boil it down, keeping the bomb off the plane is the number
one priority. A terrorist has to know that once that door closes, he or
she is locked into a confined space with dozens, if not hundreds, of
zero-tolerance people, some of whom may be armed with firearms, not to
mention the memory of United Flight 93.
BS: I've read repeated calls to privatize airport security: to return
it to the way it was pre-9/11. Personally, I think it's a bad idea, but
I'd like your opinion on the question. And regardless of what you think
should happen, do you think it will happen?
KH: From an operational security point of view, I think it works both
ways. So it is not a strategic issue for me.
SFO, our largest private airport, has excellent security and is on a par
with its federalized counterparts (in fact, I am on a flight from there
as I write this). One current federalized advantage is that we can surge
resources around the system with no notice; essentially, the ability to
move from anywhere to anywhere and mix TSOs with federal air marshals in
different force packages. We would need to be sure we don't lose that
interchangeability if we were to expand privatized screening.
I don't see a major security or economic driver that would push us to
large-scale privatization. Economically, the current cost-plus model
makes it a better deal for the government in smaller airports than in
bigger. So, maybe more small airports will privatize. If Congress
requires collective bargaining for our TSOs, that will impose an
additional overhead cost of about $500 million, which would shift the
economic balance significantly toward privatized screening. But unless
that happens, I don't see major change in this area.
BS: Last question. I regularly criticize overly specific security
measures, because forcing the terrorists to make minor modifications in
their tactics doesn't make us any safer. We've talked about specific
airline threats, but what about airplanes as a specific threat? On the
one hand, if we secure our airlines and the terrorists all decide
instead to bomb shopping malls, we haven't improved our security very
much. On the other hand, airplanes make particularly attractive targets
for several reasons. One, they're considered national symbols. Two,
they're a common and important travel vehicle, and are deeply embedded
throughout our economy. Three, they travel to distant places where the
terrorists are. And four, the failure mode is severe: a small bomb
drops the plane out of the sky and kills everyone. I don't expect you
to give back any of your budget, but when do we have "enough" airplane
security as compared with the rest of our nation's infrastructure?
KH: Airplanes are a high-profile target for terrorists for all the
reasons you cited. The reason we have the focus we do on aviation is
because of the effect the airline system has on our country, both
economically and psychologically. We do considerable work (through
grants and voluntary agreements) to ensure the safety of surface
transportation, but it's less visible to the public because people other
than ones in TSA uniforms are taking care of that responsibility.
We look at the aviation system as one component in a much larger network
that also includes freight rail, mass transit, highways, etc. And
that's just in the U.S. Then you add the world's transportation sectors
-- it's all about the network.
The only components that require specific security measures are the
critical points of failure -- and they have to be protected at virtually
any cost. It doesn't matter which individual part of the network is
attacked -- what matters is that the network as a whole is resilient
enough to operate even with losing one or more components.
The network approach allows various transportation modes to benefit from
our layers of security. Take our first layer: intel. It is fundamental
to our security program to catch terrorists long before they get to
their target, and even better if we catch them before they get into our
country. Our intel operation works closely with other international and
domestic agencies, and that information and analysis benefits all
transportation modes.
Dogs have proven very successful at detecting explosives. They work in
airports and they work in mass transit venues as well. As we test and
pilot technologies like millimeter wave in airports, we assess their
viability in other transportation modes, and vice versa.
To get back to your question, we're not at the point where we can say
"enough" for aviation security. But we're also aware of the
attractiveness of other modes and continue to use the network to share
resources and lessons learned.
BS: Thank you very much for your time. I appreciate both your time and
your candor.
KH: I enjoyed the exchange and appreciated your insights. Thanks for
the opportunity.
URL for this entire conversation:
http://www.schneier.com/interview-hawley.html
Hawley's bio:
http://www.tsa.gov/who_we_are/people/bios/kip_hawley_bio.shtm
Hawley's "Aviation Daily" blog post:
http://aviationweek.typepad.com/airports/2007/03/guest_blog_tsas.html
TSA liquid rules:
http://www.tsa.gov/311/index.shtm
Airport security tests:
http://www.9news.com/news/article.aspx?storyid=67166
http://www.rawstory.com/showoutarticle.php?src=http%3A%2F%2Fseattletimes.nwsource.com%2Fhtml%2Fnationworld%2F2003327485_screeners28.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yfpogf
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/airport_passeng.html
Problems with screening:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-110.html
Backscatter X-ray:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0605/
http://www.tsa.gov/approach/tech/backscatter.shtm
The multitude of threats and CYA security:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/02/cya_security_1.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/04/announcing_seco.html
http://www.schneier.com/essay-087.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/08/terrorism_secur.html
BeerBelly:
http://www.thebeerbelly.com/
Cell phone gun:
http://cellular.co.za/phones/gunphone/gun-phone.htm
http://urbanlegends.about.com/library/bl_cell_phone_guns.htm
http://www.strategypage.com/military_photos/cell_phone_gun_1.aspx
http://www.safetyproductsunlimited.com/cell_phone_stun_gun.html
Terrorists doing dry runs:
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/NEWS/pdfs/airport%20warning.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/yqzqlu
ID checks:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-096.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/flying_without.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/11/forge_your_own.html
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/10/nofly_list.html
Princeton professor:
http://rawstory.com/news/2007/Professor_who_criticized_Bush_added_to_0409.html
or http://tinyurl.com/yo7ljc
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/04/debunking_the_p.html
People arrested and tortured:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/29/national/main2216468.shtml
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/09/faulty_data_and.html
Redress:
http://www.epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/1106/default.html
http://www.tsa.gov/travelers/customer/redress/index.shtm
Registered Traveler:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-130.html
Behavior detection successes:
http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/man_spotted.shtm
http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/philadelphia_bank_robber.shtm
http://www.tsa.gov/press/happenings/florida_uniform.shtm
Stupid terrorists:
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/06/portrait_of_the_1.html
Hawley's House testimony:
http://www.tsa.gov/press/speeches/testimony_04192007_kip_airports.shtm
Overly specific security:
http://www.schneier.com/essay-121.html
http://www.schneier.com/essay-173.html
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
Comments from Readers
There are hundreds of comments -- many of them interesting -- on these
topics on my blog. Search for the story you want to comment on, and join
in.
http://www.schneier.com/blog
** *** ***** ******* *********** *************
CRYPTO-GRAM is a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses,
insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. You can
subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. Back issues are also
available at that URL.
Please feel free to forward CRYPTO-GRAM, in whole or in part, to
colleagues and friends who will find it valuable. Permission is also
granted to reprint CRYPTO-GRAM, as long as it is reprinted in its entirety.
CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the
best sellers "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied
Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish and Twofish algorithms.
He is founder and CTO of BT Counterpane, and is a member of the Board of
Directors of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a
frequent writer and lecturer on security topics. See
<http://www.schneier.com>.
BT Counterpane is the world's leading protector of networked information
- the inventor of outsourced security monitoring and the foremost
authority on effective mitigation of emerging IT threats. BT
Counterpane protects networks for Fortune 1000 companies and governments
world-wide. See <http://www.counterpane.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not
necessarily those of BT or BT Counterpane.
Copyright (c) 2007 by Bruce Schneier.
----- End forwarded message -----
--
Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org
______________________________________________________________
ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org
8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE
More information about the tt
mailing list